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Abstract
In University of California v. Eli Lilly, decided by the Federal Circuit in 1997, the court
established for the first time a new form of patent law’s written description requirement,
apparently targeted specifically at biotechnology. To this day, the conventional wisdom
is that the so-called Lilly written description requirement (“LWD”) exists as a
biotechnology-specific “super-enablement” requirement, substantially more stringent
than the enablement requirement (the conventional standard for patentability), and
standing as an impediment to effective patent protection for biotechnology inventions.
My objective in writing this article was to test this conventional wisdom, by conducting a
comprehensive search for all LWD decisions of the federal courts and the U.S. Patent
Office’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“BPAI”), and collecting and
individually analyzing each case. The analysis focuses on the extent to which LWD is
actually functioning as a biotechnology-specific super-enablement requirement. For
many, the results of this study will likely come as a surprise, because the empirical
evidence demonstrates that the impact of LWD in the courts and BPAI has been
minimal—for the most part, LWD does not function as a super-enablement requirement
but merely as a redundant surrogate for the enablement requirement. The article
ultimately concludes that LWD’s main impact has been one of doctrinal confusion, rather
than imposing any substantial barrier to the patenting of biotechnology inventions, and
recommends that the courts effectively discard LWD as redundant and unnecessary. It
suggests alternative approaches for addressing the valid policy concerns that implicitly
drove the original Lilly decision.

IS LILLY WRITTEN DESCRIPTION A PAPER TIGER?: A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT
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“They are paper tigers, weak and indecisive” (Frederick Forsyth).1
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I.

INTRODUCTION
The patent law’s written description requirement has traditionally functioned as a

doctrine for policing against the late claiming of new matter, i.e., to prevent patent
applicants from “adding new inventions to an older disclosure.”2 However, in the 1997
decision of Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly3 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit embarked upon a new course, holding that the written description
requirement is also a general disclosure requirement, applicable to originally filed claims
and functioning in a manner more analogous to the enablement requirement than
traditional written description.4 Lilly has been perceived by many as transforming written
description into a “super-enablement” requirement specifically targeting biotechnology
and substantially restricting the patentability of biotechnology-related inventions.5 In
particular, the decision seems to require an explicit disclosure of chemical structure to
support a patent claim reciting a biomolecule,6 such as the DNA sequences at issue in
Lilly, with the effect of dramatically limiting the scope of available patent protection for
this critically important technology. Lilly engendered a strong backlash on the part of the
biotechnology community, legal scholars and members of the judiciary, many of whom
argued vehemently that the Lilly written description doctrine (“LWD”) would prevent

2

Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle, 375 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, R., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
3
119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
4
See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 834-35 (1999) ("Thus in [ Lilly the Federal Circuit] broke new ground by
applying the written description requirement not only to later-filed claims but also to claims filed in the
original patent”) requirement." See infra Part III.
5
See infra Part III.
6
Although the term biomolecule can be used in a broader sense, in this article the term is limited to
polynucleotides (e.g., DNA, RNA, nucleic acids) and polypeptides (e.g., proteins and peptides).
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biotechnology inventors from achieving adequate patent protection for their inventions,
to the substantial detriment of the industry and society as a whole.7
In this article, I rigorously address the following question: in the nine years since
Lilly was decided, what has been the actual impact of LWD in the courts and the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (the “PTO”)? To that end, I have conducted a
comprehensive search for all publicly accessible decisions of the federal courts and the
PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“BPAI”) that decide an issue of LWD.
Each decision is individually reviewed and analyzed, with an eye toward discerning the
extent to which the dire predictions concerning LWD have come to pass. The results to
be gleaned from this exercise might come as a surprise to many, for they reveal that for
the most part LWD has had a relatively minor impact in the courts and BPAI.
In Part II of this paper, I begin by reviewing the traditional written description and
enablement requirements, with some emphasis on the application of the enablement
requirement to biotechnology and chemical inventions. Part III discusses Lilly, the
genesis of LWD, and the Federal Circuit’s subsequent retreat from a strict application of
LWD in Enzo Biochem v. Gen-Probe (Enzo II). The results of my summary of LWD in
the courts and BPAI are presented in Part IV, and in Part V I conclude with some general
observations and commentary.
II.

THE TRADITIONAL WRITTEN DESCRIPTION AND ENABLEMENT REQUIREMENTS
Section 112 of the patent statute requires that a patent specification “contain a

written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using
it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art …
7

See infra Part III.
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to make and use the same.”8 This clause is the statutory basis for two discreet
patentability requirements, the enablement and written description requirements.9
Prior to Lilly, the enablement and written description requirements were generally
understood to serve distinct and essentially non-overlapping purposes, and the criteria for
compliance with each were likewise distinct. The written description requirement
functioned as a tool for policing against attempts by patent applicants to alter their patent
claims during the course of patent prosecution10 to encompass “new matter” not
adequately described in the originally filed patent application.11 As summarized in a
recent Federal Circuit decision, the “function of the [written] description requirement is
to ensure that the inventor had possession, as of the filing date of the application relied
on, of the specific subject matter later claimed by him."12
Because the written description requirement traditionally functioned solely as a
tool for policing priority and to prevent patent applicants from claiming “new matter,” it
was considered inapplicable to originally filed patent claims. An original patent claim is
part of the patent specification, and since a claim inherently describes the subject matter
it encompasses it must satisfy the written description requirement, or at least that was the
consensus opinion prior to Lilly.13

8

35 USC § 112, ¶ 1 (2004).
In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967) has been identified as the earliest decision wherein the
written description requirement was clearly identified as a requirement of patentability distinct from
enablement. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
10
Patent prosecution is the “process of applying for a patent through the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
and negotiating with the patent officer”. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY [?] (8th ed. 2004).
11
See, e.g., 3-7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.04 (2006). (providing a comprehensive
explanation of the written description requirement).
12
Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed Cir. 2003) (citing In re Wertheim,
541 F.2d 257, 262 (C.C.P.A. 1976)).
13
See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1308 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, R.,
dissenting) (citing previous decisions of the C.C.P.A. ).
9
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The enablement requirement, on the other hand, applies to both original and
amended claims, and essentially requires the patent specification to enable a person
having ordinary skill in the art, often referred to as the “PHOSITA,” to practice the
invention without engaging in “undue experimentation.”14 The Federal Circuit has
established a number of criteria, commonly referred to as the “Wands factors,” to be
considered by the court and PTO in assessing a patent specification for compliance with
the enablement requirement.15
The enablement requirement is also used to police claim breadth, limiting
inventors to a scope of claim coverage commensurate with the scope of the actual
inventive disclosure in the patent specification. An inventor is permitted to claim her
invention in broad terms that encompass various embodiments not specifically described,
or even enabled by the disclosure in the patent specification.16 However, there is a limit
on overly expansive claim coverage, and that limit has traditionally been determined by
application of the enablement requirement. Under conventional enablement
jurisprudence, the scope of a patent claim must bear some “reasonable correlation” with
the scope of disclosure in the patent specification.17
One of the earliest decisions where the “reasonable correlation” test was applied
to what might be characterized as a biotechnology invention was In re Fisher.18 The
invention was an improved process for purifying adrenocorticotrophic hormones

14

In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736-737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Id. at 737.
16
See, e.g., Infigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Technology, Inc., 65 F.Supp.2d 967, 975 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (“It
is black letter law that claims are not limited to the embodiment described in the patent specifications.
Moreover, a patent claim may encompass uses not anticipated by the inventor and therefore not described
in the patent.”) (citations omitted).
17
In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
18
427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
15
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(ACTH), naturally-occurring protein hormone useful in the treatment of arthritis. Fisher
asserted that the prior art had failed to produce an ACTH preparation having an activity
of 1 International Units per milligram (IU/mg), but that his improved process had allowed
him to produce ACTH preparations having activities of between 1.11 and 2.30 IU/mg.19
This increase in activity translated into improved purity and potency, which enhanced
therapeutic efficacy, clearly a breakthrough deserving of some patent protection.
However, Fisher sought to patent all ACTH preparations having an activity greater than 1
IU/mg, including preparations far exceeding the 2.30 IU/mg he had actually enabled.
Clearly the scope of the patent claim extended well beyond the inventor’s actual
achievement; the question for the court was did the claim’s scope exceed a “reasonable
correlation” with the scope of disclosure?
The court began by affirming the bedrock principle that an inventor is allowed a
scope of patent coverage that will “dominate the future patentable inventions of others
where those inventions were based in some way on his teachings,” including
improvements not specifically described and that would not be obvious based on the
teachings of the disclosure.20 However, the court held that by failing to include an upper
activity limit on the claim, the scope of asserted patent coverage crossed the line between
a permitted “domination” of subsequent improvements and inventions, and into the
forbidden realm exceeding a “reasonable correlation to the scope of enablement provided
by the specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art.”21

19

Id. at 834. The International Unit (IU) is a measure of potency, which is related to the efficacy of the
purification process.
20
Id. at 839.
21
Id.
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In Fisher, the court articulated four basic tenets regarding the relationship
between claim scope and enablement that are still the standard today: (1) claim scope can
substantially exceed the scope of disclosure to encompass patentably distinct variants and
improvements;22 (2) claim scope cannot, however, be expanded so far as to exceed a
“reasonable correlation” with the scope of disclosure;23 (3) the permitted scope of
coverage is related to the predictability of the area of technology at issue;24 and (4)
biotechnology and chemical inventions are generally less predictable than mechanical
and electrical inventions, and hence generally less likely to be eligible for expansive
scope of coverage.25
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (Amgen Inc. v. HMR) provides an
example of the Federal Circuit upholding the validity of broad biotechnology claims
encompassing variants not specifically described or “enabled” by the patent
specification.26 Based on the disclosure of methods for expressing recombinant EPO27 in
two mammalian cell lines (COS-1 and CHO), Amgen obtained patent claims covering (i)
all pharmaceutical compositions comprising a therapeutically effective amount of human
EPO purified from mammalian cell culture; (ii) the production of any EPO that is either
non-naturally occurring or not isolated from human urine; and (iii) all vertebrate cells that
can be propagated in vitro, comprise “non-human DNA sequences that control

22

Id.
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. However, in In re Cook, the court indicated that the distinction is more properly ''denominated a
dichotomy between predictable and unpredictable factors in any art rather than between 'mechanical cases'
and 'chemical cases.’” In re Cook , 439 F.2d 730, 734 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
26
314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
27
EPO is short for erythropoietin, a hormone that stimulates the production and release of red blood cells in
response to low oxygen levels. Id. at 1319, 1321.
23
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transcription” and produce a recited amount of EPO.28 The Federal Circuit found the
claims to encompass and be infringed by production methods and recombinant human
cells that were not described or contemplated in the patent specification.29 Moreover, the
infringing cells and processes could not have been made at the time Amgen’s patents
were filed, because the necessary technology was not developed until years later.30
Nevertheless, the court upheld the validity of the claims, skirting the “reasonable
correlation” test and holding that “the law makes clear that the specification need teach
only one mode of making and using a claimed composition.”31 The problem with the
courts analysis, as noted by a dissent to the decision,32 is that the specification did not
teach any mode of creating certain embodiments falling with within the scope of the
claims, such as the recombinant human cells and EPO produced by HMR.33
On the other hand, courts have on numerous occasions invoked the “reasonable
correlation” test to invalidate broad biotechnology and chemical claims.34 For example,

28

Id. at 1322-23.
Id. at 1334 (finding that the patentee could not have described the infringing method because it was not
developed until ten years after the patent was filed).
30
This later-developed technology was itself the subject of its own patent protection. Infra n.103.
31
Id. at 1335.
32
Id. at 1359.
33
Other examples where courts have found broad “dominating” claims extending well beyond the
disclosure of the patent specification to nevertheless comply with the enablement requirement include In re
Hogan 559 F.2d 595 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (disclosure of method of producing crystalline polymer of
polypropylene was sufficient to enable a claim encompassing amorphous polymer of polypropylene, even
though amorphous polymer was not enabled); and Hormone Research Foundation Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
904 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (disclosure of a method for producing human growth hormone can provide
sufficient enabling disclosure to support a claim encompassing purer and more potent forms of the hormone
that could not be produced using the teaching of the disclosure).
34
See, e.g., In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (claims directed to chimeric genes comprising a
Cyanobacterium promoter region operatively linked to a gene encoding a bacillus insecticidal protein were
not enabled by patent specification that describes provides working examples for only a single species of
Cyanobacterium and only mentions 9 out of the roughly 150 different known genera of Cyanobacterium);
In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (claims directed generically to methods of producing vaccines
against avian RNA viruses not enabled by a general description of the process and one working example
describing the production of a vaccine effective against a single strain of avian RNA virus); In re Goodman
11 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (claims covering expression of mammalian peptides in any plant cell
(monocot or dicot) not enabled because at the time the patent application was filed the technology was not
29
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in In re Wright35 an attempt was made to claim all vaccines against RNA viruses, based
on the disclosure of a single working example describing the production of a vaccine
effective against a single strain of avian RNA virus.36 Other examples from the realm of
biotechnology include In re Goodman,37 where the applicant attempted to claim the
expression of mammalian peptides in any plant based on success in a dicot, even though
monocots were not enabled,38 and Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 39 where the
applicant essentially attempted to claim the use of antisense technology40 in any cell type
based on a disclosure limited to E. coli, a single species of bacteria.
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co, Ltd. is a striking example of the
Federal Circuit applying a particularly strict interpretation of the reasonable correlation
test.41 Amgen’s patent was based on the isolation and structural characterization the

available for inserting genes into the genome of a monocot); Genentech Inc. v. The Wellcome Foundation
Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1564-65 n.24 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (in construing claims, court found that applying a broad
definition of the term “human tissue plasminogen activator'' would render the claims overly broad and
invalid for failure to comply with the enablement requirement); Enzo Biochem v. Calgene, 188 F.3d 1362
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (claims directed broadly to use of antisense technology in any cell type were not enabled
by disclosure limited to E. coli, a single species of bacteria); Plant Genetic Systems, N.V. v. DeKalb
Genetics Corp.315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (claim covering any plant cell (monocot or dicot) having
defined heterologous DNA sequence inserted into its genome was not enabled because at the time the
patent application was filed the technology was not available for inserting genes into the genome of a
monocot); Chiron v. Genentech, 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (disclosure of a mouse antibody capable of
binding a specific human breast cancer antigen did not enable claim covering chimeric antibody capable of
binding same antigen).
35
999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
36
Note that a number of important human disease are caused by RNA viruses, such as HIV, and thus the
scope of coverage would encompass potential future innovations of great importance that are not enabled
by the disclosure.
37
11 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
38
Flowering plants fall into two classifications: monocots characterized by having only one cotyledon
(“seed leaf”) produced by the embryo, and the dicot having two cotyledon produced by the embryo.
University of California Museum of Paleontology Glossary, at
http://www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/glossary/gloss8/monocotdicot.html. (last visited Sept. 6, 2006).
39
188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
40
Antisense technology is the process in which the antisense strand hydrogen bonds with the targeted sense
strand. When an antisense strand binds to a mRNA sense strand, a cell will recognize the double helix as
foreign to the cell and proceed to degrade the faulty mRNA molecule, thus preventing the production of the
undesired protein. www.bio.davidson.edu/Courses?Molbio/MolStudents/01suschultz/homepage.html, last
accessed 8/30/06.
41
927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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human gene encoding erythropoietin (EPO),42 a major accomplishment, because it
allowed for the large-scale manufacturing of recombinant EPO.43 A patent claim limited
to the gene encoding naturally-occurring (i.e., native) human EPO might have been easily
circumvented by a competitor producing a structural variant of EPO retaining the desired
functional attributes of the native protein, e.g., by a technique such as site-directed
mutagenesis.44 In an attempt to preclude this sort of trivial design around, Amgen
obtained a patent claim encompassing any DNA sequence encoding a protein having an
amino acid sequence “sufficiently duplicative” of erythropoietin (EPO) to retain the
function of EPO.45 The Federal Circuit invoked the enablement requirement to and the
“reasonable correlation” test to invalidate the claim as overly broad.
Amgen v. Chugia was written by Judge Lourie, author of Lilly, and the leading
advocate for LWD on the Federal Circuit, and clearly foreshadows the focus on chemical
structure evident in Lilly and other related biotechnology cases.46 In particular, the court
points to the “manifold possibilities” for changes to the structure of EPO “with attendant
42

In the language of biotechnology, the scientists cloned and sequenced the gene, which allowed for the
recombinant expression of EPO.
43
Recombinant EPO, sold under trade names such as EPOGEN by Amgen and others, is used to treat
anemia, and was one of the first, and still is one of the most successful of all biotechnology products.
Amgen, Inc. website, http://www.amgen.com/patients/products_epogen.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2006).
44
Site-directed mutagenesis was well known and specifically described in the Amgen patents, along with a
description of using the technique to make functionally-equivalent variants of the disclosed EPO. See,
e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,703,008. The vulnerability of narrow biomolecule claims to infringement by trivial
design around is described in detail in Christopher M. Holman, Protein Similarity Score: A Simplified
Version of the BLAST Score as a Superior Alternative to Percent Identity for Claiming Genuses of Related
Protein Sequences, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 55 (2004). See also Enzo Biochem,
Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc. 323 F.3d 956, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (expert testified that broad claim scope covering
an “astronomical” number of mutated variants of a disclosed genetic sequence is necessary to protect
against copyists who could otherwise make a minor change to the sequence and thereby avoid infringement
while still exploiting the benefits of the invention).
45
In particular, any EPO variants sharing native EPO’s biological property of causing an increased
production of red blood cells, the characteristic that made recombinant EPO an extremely useful drug for
treating anemia.
46
See also, Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed.Cir.1993) and In re Wallach, 378 F.3d 1330 (CAFC 2004).
The focus on chemical structure in assessing the patentability of biomolecule is also evident in In re Bell
and In re Deuel, two other decisions penned by Judge Lourie but in the context of nonobviousness. In re
Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed.Cir.1993); In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (1995).
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uncertainty as to what utility will be possessed by these analogs,” and the failure of
Amgen to identify “structural requirements for producing compounds with EPO-like
activity.”47 The court also faults the Amgen for claiming “an astronomical number of
species” while disclosing how to make and use only a few of them, a concern which
reappears in Lilly albeit in the context of written description.
The BPAI has also applied the enablement requirement’s “reasonable correlation”
test in a similar matter to broad biomolecule claims lacking structure-based limitations.
For example, in Ex parte Maizel,48 a patent applicant disclosed the amino acid sequence
of a protein (human B-cell growth factor) and attempted to claim any DNA vector
encoding that protein or a “biologically functional equivalent thereof.” The Board held
the claim invalid for lack of enablement, opining that the “problem with the phrase
‘biologically functional equivalent thereof’ is that it covers any conceivable means, i.e.,
cell or DNA, which achieves the stated biological result while the specification discloses,
at most, only a specific DNA segment known to the inventor.”49
Thus, it is clear that prior to Lilly the courts and PTO already had in the
enablement requirement a fairly robust doctrinal tool for limiting patent claims to a scope
commensurate with the inventor’s disclosure, and had on occasion applied the
requirement with some rigor to biotechnology inventions, e.g., Amgen v. Chugai and Ex
parte Maizel. Professor Janis has noted that the courts have for the most part failed to
exercise the potential power of the enablement as a tool for limiting claim scope.50 Any
47

927 F.2d at 1214
27 USPQ2d 1662 (BPAI 1992). See also, Ex parte Ishizaka, 24 USPQ2d 1621 (B.P.A.I. 1992) and
Fiddes v. Baird, 30 USPQ2d 1481 (B.P.A.I. 1993).
49
Id. at 1665.
50
Mark D. Janis, Contending with the "Written Description" Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent
Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 55, 106-108 (2000).
48
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critical assessment of LWD as a “super-enablement” should be undertaken with this in
mind.
III.

THE GENESIS OF LWD

A.

Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly
In 1997, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co. substantially blurred what had

been a clear delineation between the enablement and written description requirements.51
The patent at issue arose out of the successful cloning of the rat insulin gene,52 a technical
tour de force achieved by scientists at the University of California at the dawn of the
biotechnology era.53 In the patent specification, the inventors provided the chemical
structure of the rat gene, i.e., the gene’s “sequence,” along with a description of the
specific methodology used to isolate the gene, and a prophetic description purporting to
describe how one would go about isolating the gene from other mammals and vertebrates,
including man.54 UC succeeded in convincing the PTO that this limited disclosure was
adequate to support a patent claim specifically covering the human insulin gene, and
other claims generically encompassing all mammalian and all vertebrate insulin genes.
UC then sued Eli Lilly, alleging that Lilly’s production of recombinant human insulin
infringed the patent. However, the district court hearing the case held that the human,

51

119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
In this context the term “insulin gene” is used as shorthand for what would be more accurately described
as a cDNA encoding rat proinsulin.
53
Lilly involved two patents, but the one of interest for our purposes is U.S. Patent No. 4,652,525.
54
A gene is essentially a chemical compound, a type of DNA molecule, comprising a string of chemical
building blocks referred to as “bases.” Likewise, a protein is essentially a string of amino acids, another
type of chemical building block. With respect to both DNA and proteins, molecular biologists commonly
use the term “sequence” to refer both to the molecule itself and to the molecule’s structure. In attempt to
minimize confusion, in this article I generally use the word “sequence” to refer to the actual DNA or
protein molecule, and the word “structure” to refer to the molecules chemical structure.
52
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mammalian and vertebrate claims were invalid for failure to satisfy the written
description requirement, and on appeal the Federal Circuit affirmed.55
The biotechnology and patent communities was shocked by Lilly, particularly
because of the novel manner in which the court applied the written description
requirement to originally filed claims, and the stringent disclosure requirements the
decision seemed to impose on biotechnology inventors. For example, with respect to the
claim specifically directed to the human insulin gene, the court held that “[a]n adequate
written description of a DNA ‘requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula,
chemical name, or physical properties,’ not a mere wish or plan for obtaining the claimed
chemical invention.”56 Because the specification did not provide the “relevant structural
or physical characteristics” of the human gene, i.e., its genetic sequence, it did not
provide adequate written description, regardless of whether the specification enabled the
human gene.57
With respect to the broader claims directed to mammalian and vertebrate insulin
genes, the court held that a generic description, such as “vertebrate insulin [gene],” was
insufficient absent some structural description that would allow one to distinguish genetic
sequences falling within the scope of the claim from other, non-claimed genetic
sequences. The court viewed the claimed genus of genetic sequences as being defined
solely in terms of function, i.e., the ability to encode for insulin, and held that such a
purely functional description was insufficient with respect to chemical inventions in

55

119 F.3d at 1575.
Id. at 1565 (citing Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed.Cir.1993)).
57
Neither the Federal Circuit nor the district court decisions even speculate as to whether any of the claims
at issue were enabled, and the issue was never raised by the parties in their briefs submitted to the Federal
Circuit.
56
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general, and DNA sequences in particular. The court posited that adequate written
description to support a claimed genus of genes “may be achieved by means of a
recitation of a representative number of [genes], defined by nucleotide sequence, falling
within the scope of the genus or of a recitation of structural features common to the
members of the genus, which features constitute a substantial portion of the genus.”58
While providing no guidance with respect to how many representative species might be
required, nor what if any alternative avenues might exist for supporting a genus claim
encompassing a family of related genetic sequences, the court held that the single rat
sequence was insufficient to support a claim reciting all mammalian or all vertebrate
species.
In Lilly, the court applies written description in a manner closely analogous to
enablement, but the standard for compliance appears to be more stringent than the
enablement requirement. In particular, while the enablement requirement mandates that
the specification to teach the PHOSITA to make and use the invention without “undue
experimentation,” in Lilly the court interprets the written description requirement as
requiring a “precise definition of a molecule’s physical or structural characteristics.” At
least with respect to genetic sequences, the court appears to be requiring a precise,
nucleotide-by-nucleotide recitation of chemical structure. And while enablement merely
requires a “reasonable correlation” between the scope of disclosure and the scope of the
claims, Lilly seems require some sort of structure-based definition of a claimed genus of
molecules, achievable by providing a “representative number” of structurally defined

58

Id.

15

examples, or a recitation of common structural features sufficient to distinguish the
genus.
In recognition of the fundamental difference between traditional written
description and written description as applied by the court in Lilly, subsequent courts and
commentators have characterized the written description requirement as composed of two
distinct prongs: (1) the traditional written description requirement that polices priority
and does not apply to originally filed claims, and (2) the Lilly written description
requirement (“LWD”).59
In assessing the impact of LWD, it should be noted that the claims at issue in Lilly
could have been invalidated under the enablement requirement, without needing to resort
to written description. With respect to the to the human insulin gene claim, a reasonable
court could concluded that the specification did not provide sufficient guidance to enable
a PHOSITA to successfully isolate the gene without engaging in “undue
experimentation.” In this regard, it must be remembered that the patent claimed a priority
date of 1977, a time when the methodology for cloning genes was just being developed
and when the process was far from routine or predictable.60 The patent specification
provides a prophetic example describing a proposed method for cloning the human gene
(essentially the same method used to clone the rat gene), but this methodology apparently
did not work for the human gene, because the same inventors reported eventually cloning
the human gene using a very different methodology.61 In any event, although reasonable
59

See, e.g., Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 1989 WL 169006 (D.Mass. 1989), for a description of the
unpredictability associated with attempting to clone a gene in the early 1980’s several years after UC’s
filing date.
61
In U.S. Patent No. 4,431,740, the UC inventors report isolating the human insulin gene by in situ
hybridization screening. In U.S. Patent No. 4,652,525, the patent with respect to which written description
60
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minds might differ with respect to application of the “undue experimentation” standard to
the facts of this case, clearly a court seeking to invalidate the claim would have been able
to reasonably characterize the invention as requiring undue experimentation based on the
fact that the technology was nascent, and the only methodology described in the
specification for cloning the human insulin gene was apparently never successfully
implemented.
Turning to the claims broadly asserting patent rights in the insulin genes from any
mammal, or even any vertebrate, an invocation of the “reasonable correlation” should
have been sufficient to invalidate these claims. At that early stage in the study of
molecular biology, when many mammals had not been the subject of any such research, a
strong case could have been made that it would have required more than an undue
amount of experimentation to successfully clone the genes from other mammals and
vertebrates.
B.

The Backlash Against Lilly
Lilly has proven to be a highly controversial decision. Many commentators have

characterized LWD as a “super-enablement requirement” substantially limiting the ability
of inventors to patent biotechnological inventions, some going so far as to suggest that
the doctrine actually poses a substantial threat to the vitality of the biotechnology
industry. Typical of the tone in the immediate aftermath of Lilly was an article, published
in 1998, which lambasted Lilly as “an unmitigated disaster that if followed, has the

was at issue, the prophetic example purporting to enable the isolation of the human insulin gene relies on a
different methodology that does not involve in situ hybridization screening. In situ hybridization screening
is not even mentioned in the ‘525 patent.
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potential for causing untold havoc in the biotechnology field.”62 In the same year,
another commentator wrote that “[in] Lilly, the Federal Circuit has fashioned a newly
heightened Written Description standard unique to biotechnological inventions. . . . The
Lilly decision may profoundly limit the scope of protection available for new gene
inventions.” 63 This view of Lilly has survived through the years. 64 For example, in
2002, another commentator wrote that, in Lilly, the “Federal Circuit has effectively
eliminated patent protection for biotechnology inventions pertaining to proteins.” 65 And
in 2004, Professor Holbrook stated that “failure to have a full disclosure of examples in
the biotechnology field may invite a rejection for want of ‘possession’ of the invention,
and hence lack of a ‘written description.’"66
Some members of the judiciary have also weighed in with their concerns
regarding LWD. For example, Judge Michel of the Federal Circuit has argued that LWD,
in conjunction with a restrictive interpretation of the doctrine of equivalents, will
effectively preclude biotechnology inventors from achieving adequate patent protection
their inventions.67
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Harris A. Pitlick, The Mutation of the Description Requirement Gene 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC'Y 209, 222 (1998).
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Sheila R. Arriola, Biotechnology Patents after Festo: Rethinking the Heightenedd Enablement and
Written Description Requirements, 11 FED. CIRCUIT B. J. 919, 951 (2002). See also, Shradda A.
Upadhyaya, The Postmodern Written Description Requirement: An Analysis of the Application of the
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66
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Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 617 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Michel, P.
concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part) (“Considering the vast number of specific amino acid sequences that
an applicant would be forced to disclose and claim in order to secure meaningful protection for his
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Judge Rader is probably the most outspoken critic of the Lilly doctrine on the
Federal Circuit. For example, he wrote in his dissent to the Federal Circuit’s decision not
to rehear Univ. of Rochester v. Searle en banc:68
The Eli Lilly doctrine also seems to impose some illogical
requirements on patent drafters today. Must a software patent disclose
every potential coding variation that performs a claimed function? Must a
biotechnological invention list every amino acid variation for a particular
protein or protein function--a task conceivably as impractical as the
software disclosure requirement? Must a university or small biotech
company expend scarce resources to produce every potential nucleotide
sequence that exhibits their inventive functions? Perhaps more important
for overall patent policy, must inventors spend their valuable time and
resources fleshing out all the obvious variants of their last invention
instead of pursuing their next significant advance in the useful arts? Again
Eli Lilly and Rochester appear to have given little thought to these
unintended consequences.
The apprehension surrounding LWD focused primarily on its apparent effect of
limiting patent protection to DNA and other biomolecules for which the patent applicant
has disclosed “precisely defined” chemical structures. For example, Judge Rader
recently interpreted Lilly as requiring a “nucleotide-by-nucleotide recitation of the
structure of a biotechnological invention.”69 This view that LWD requires a precise
structural definition engendered much of the outcry against Lilly.70

invention, I feel the majority's rule puts an impossible burden on both the applicant and the PTO.”), vacated
535 U.S. 722.
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373 F.3d at 1313-1314.
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375 F.3d at 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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See, e,g., Elliot Marshall, Court Takes a Narrow View of UC’s Claim, 277 SCIENCE 1029 (1997)
(predicting that Lilly will have a broad impact on biotechnology by “compelling gene hunters to spell out
the exact sequence of the DNA they hope to claim, rather than just the function of the genes”); Margaret J.
Sampson, The Evolution of the Enablement and Written Description Requirements under 35 USC 112 in
the Area of Biotechnology, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1233, 1273 (2000) (concluding that Lilly requires the
disclosure of exact nucleotide sequences for genetic material, which she says is a good thing (putting her in
the minority of commentators)); David Kelly , The Federal Circuit Transforms the Written Description
Requirement into a Biotech-Specific Hurdle to Obtaining Patent Protection for Biotechnology Patents, 13
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 249, 270 (2002) (concluding that Lilly imposes a unique biotech-specific written
description standard to limit DNA claims to specific sequence disclosed); Mueller, supra note 63 at 631
(concluding that Lilly announced a “precise definition” test for the written description of DNA inventions);
Mark A. Lemley & Dan L. Burk, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L.R. 1575, 1678-1679 (2003)
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LWD has also been viewed as profoundly limiting the scope of patent protection
available for biotechnological inventions, leaving inventors with very narrow claims,
easily designed around by slight modification to a disclosed structure.71 For example,
Lemley and Burk recently wrote that in biotechnology LWD “has been applied as a sort
of "super-enablement" requirement, forcing biotech patentees to list particular gene
sequences in order to obtain a patent covering those sequences. . . . The Federal Circuit
has applied the [Lilly] doctrine to biotechnology cases in a way that would be
inconceivable in other industries, such as software. The effect is to narrow the scope of
biotechnology patents – or at least DNA patents – rather dramatically.”72 Commentators
have posited that LWD, in conjunction with the Federal Circuit’s apparent reluctance to
find a DNA sequence obvious absent explicit disclosure in the prior art, render it very
easy to get a patent covering a newly disclosed DNA sequence, but that the protection
will be very narrow, resulting in numerous extremely narrow DNA patents.73
To summarize, LWD has been characterized as problematic for the patent system,
and for biotechnology inventors in particular, owing primarily to the perception that: (1)
LWD requires an explicit description of chemical structure in order to support a claim to
a genetic sequence or other biomolecule, e.g., a “nucleotide-by-nucleotide listing”; and

(stating essentially that one can only patent specific sequences that have actually been isolated or
sequenced); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, 54 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 691, 704 (2004) (“Under the Federal Circuit's precedent, a researcher will be able to claim only
sequences disclosed under the stringent written description rules--the actual sequence in hand, so to
speak.”).
71
Holman, supra note 44.
72
Lemley & Burk, supra note 70, at 1652-54. See also, Mueller, supra note 63 at 649 (“In practical terms,
Lilly may profoundly limit the scope of protection available for new gene inventions.”); Daniel P.
Chisholm, The Effect of the USPTO’s Written Description Guidelines on Gene Patent Applications, 35
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 543 (concluding that narrow patents on genetic inventions, as required by Lilly, could
provide insufficient incentives and impede genetic research).
73
Id. at 1594-95.
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(2) LWD functions as a super-enablement requirement substantially restricting the
availability of adequate claim scope for biotech inventions.
C.

Enzo I: The Worst Fears Confirmed
It was not until five years after Lilly that the Federal Circuit decided a case

involving an application of LWD, but that decision seemed to confirm the worst fears of
Lilly’s critics. In Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc. (Enzo I),74 the inventors had
discovered three naturally-occurring DNA sequences (derived from the genome of N.
gonorroheae, the pathogenic bacteria that causes gonorrhea) that were useful as
hybridization probes for distinguishing between N. gonorroheae and N. meningitides, a
closely related but non-pathogenic bacteria. The DNA sequences served as useful tools
for diagnosing patients infected with gonorrhea, while avoiding false positives associated
with the use of probes that could not distinguish between the two species of bacteria, and
the inventors filed a patent application claiming the three sequences.
The inventors apparently understood that a patent limited to the three sequences
would afford only narrow protection, and could easily be designed around.75 For
example, each of the three sequences was relatively long, ranging from 850 to 1300 bases
in length,76 substantially longer than would be required to serve as functional probes.
Given these starting sequences, one would expect a PHOSITA to be able to identify
fragments of the three sequences (subsequences), or mutated variants of the three
sequences, that would retain the functional utility of the full-length sequences.
Furthermore, aided by the inventors’ disclosure, a PHOSITA could likely identify other
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285 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (vacated 323 F.3d 956).
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285 F.3d at 1024.
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DNA sequences from the N. gonorroheae genome able to distinguish between the two
species of bacteria, i.e., structurally distinct albeit functionally equivalent substitutes for
the three specifically identified DNA sequences. In an attempt to preclude these
possibilities, the inventors patented their invention broadly, claiming not only the three
sequences but functionally equivalent variants. In particular, the patent included a claim
encompassing subsequences and “mutated” variants of the specifically disclosed
sequences retaining the ability to distinguish between the two bacteria. An even broader
claim recited, in purely functional terms, essentially any polynucleotide capable of
distinguishing between the two bacteria, i.e., without any structural limitations on the
sequence.
Prior to filing the patent application, the inventors did not determine the chemical
structures of the three DNA sequences. They did, however, deposit samples of the DNA
sequences with the American Type Culture Collection (ATCC), a publicly accessible
depository for biological samples. While this did not explicitly make the structures of the
sequences public, it did in principle enable the public to determine the structures of the
sequences, which could be accomplished by obtaining samples from the ATCC and using
conventional molecular biotechnology techniques to determine the structures of the
deposited sequences. In the patent, the applicants described and claimed the DNA
sequences by reference to the deposited samples, providing no structural description of
the molecules. The PTO found that the deposits were sufficient to fulfill the disclosure
requirements of section 112, and granted the patent.77
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Note that Enzo’s patent issued in 1990, long before Lilly, and at a time when the use of biological
deposits to satisfy the Section 112 disclosure requirements had long been sanctioned by the courts and PTO
procedure. U.S. Patent No. 4, 900, 659. The use of deposit was thought of as being necessary, and
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In Enzo I, a divided panel of the Federal Circuit upheld a district court’s
determination, as a matter of law, that LWD could not be satisfied with respect to a
claimed DNA sequence by a deposit that failed to explicitly disclose the sequence’s
chemical structure. The court summarily dismissed the patentee’s argument that
“possession” is the ultimate hallmark of adequate written description, and that the
deposits clearly demonstrated the inventors’ actual, physical possession of the claimed
DNA sequences. According to the court in Enzo I, mere physical possession is not
necessarily enough to satisfy LWD.78
The court went on to cite a number of policy concerns that would arise if mere
deposit were sufficient to satisfy LWD. In particular, the court noted that without a
“written” description of a DNA sequence a patent examiner would not be able to
determine whether or not the sequence is new or nonobvious, and hence such a
description was necessary in order to assure a proper examination.79 The court also
found that a mere deposit provided insufficient notice to potential infringers as to the
scope of the claim - “to require the public to go to a public depository and perform
experiments to identify an invention is not consistent with the statutory requirement to
describe one’s invention in the specification.” 80
Both of these policy concerns would seem to be legitimate. In practice, it would
be impossible for a patent examiner to determine whether the deposited sequences fell
within the prior art, because the examiner would have no way of knowing the identity of

sufficient, for the enablement of inventions involving biological materials that could not be enabled by
other means. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.801-809 (2006).
78
285 F.3d at 1020-21.
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Id.at 1022.
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the sequences. The PTO has no capability for sequencing deposited biological samples.
And it is clearly burdensome to require members of the public to obtain and determine
the structure for the deposited samples in order to figure out whether they might infringe
the patent. Indeed, if determining the sequences for the deposits is truly a routine
exercise, would it not make more sense to put the burden upon the patentee to determine
the sequences, than to put the burden on any third party concerned with avoiding
infringement?
In any event, while Enzo I faithfully followed Lilly, and did address the policy
concerns expressed by the court, the decision also raised a number of troubling policy
concerns of its own. Some of these were noted by Judge Dyk in his dissent to Enzo I.
For example, he noted that many biotechnology patents had been filed, prosecuted and
issued under a regime wherein it was understood that deposit of DNA sequences was
sufficient to satisfy 112, and the unfairness of disrupting the settled expectations of all
these inventors by essentially changing the rules late in the game and introducing a
completely new disclosure requirement, effectively invalidating a host of issued
biotechnology patents.81
4.

Enzo II and the Demise of Strict Lilly Written Description
Enzo petitioned for an en banc rehearing of Enzo I. Perhaps to avoid en banc

reconsideration of the LWD doctrine, the panel that decided Enzo I vacated its original
opinion, replacing it with Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc. (Enzo II). 82 Enzo II
reversed the district court’s decision, and to a large extent repudiated Enzo I and Lilly
itself.
81
82
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In particular, Enzo II clearly rejects the idea that LWD requires a disclosure of
structure for DNA inventions, holding as a matter of law that structure is not required
when a claimed DNA molecule is made publicly accessible by means of deposit.83 In
justifying its flip-flop, the court noted the long tradition of inventors using biological
deposits to satisfy the enablement requirement, the practical difficulties of describing
unique biological materials in words, the potential for disruption of the settled
expectations of biotechnology patent owners, and that the structures for the three DNA
sequences “may not have been reasonably obtainable, and in any event were not known
to Enzo when it filed its application in 1986.”84 Essentially, in Enzo II the court finds
that the technical obstacles to determining DNA structure from a deposit justify the use of
deposit to satisfy LWD, while in Enzo I the court had pointed to those very same
technical obstacles as policy justifications for finding deposit inadequate to satisfy
LWD.85 Enzo II holds that the necessary “possession” can be demonstrated by a showing
that a PHOSITA would be able to predictably derive the DNA structures from the
deposits using standard methodology, i.e., the LWD inquiry is effectively collapsed into a
test for enablement.86
The court then went even further, holding that extremely broad claims
encompassing any functional substitute for the three deposited sequences, unconstrained
by any structural limitations, might comply with the written description requirement if
the deposits “indicate the patentee has invented species sufficient to constitute the
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genera.”87 The court also held that the claims to subsequences and mutated variants of
the disclosed sequences satisfy LWD if the deposited samples “demonstrate possession”
of the claimed subsequences and mutated variants.88 As is so often the case in
subsequent Federal Circuit decisions applying LWD, the court provides no guidance for
the district court with respect to what criteria it should use in its assessment of
“demonstrated possession” and “invention of species sufficient to constitute the genera.”
Shortly after Enzo II, a commentator noted that Enzo I was decided in a manner
entirely consistent with Lilly, and that if Enzo I was indeed wrongly decided, as the court
implicitly acknowledged in vacating the decision, then logically Lilly itself must be
wrong.89 I believe that history has borne out this assessment of the import of the Enzo
decisions. In retrospect, it is clear that since Enzo II the significance of LWD as a
distinct doctrine of patentability has been on a steady decline, and that the courts have for
the most part limited the holding in Lilly to the facts of that case.90
Although the court’s effective reversal of Enzo I avoided exposing LWD to the
scrutiny of an en banc Federal Circuit, three judges on the court did dissent from the
decision not to rehear the case en banc, including Judge Rader, the court’s most vocal
critic of LWD.91 These judges asserted that the development of a distinct written
description requirement outside its original context of policing new matter was wrong
and should be reversed.92 A fourth member of the court, Judge Dyk, who wrote a strong
dissent in Enzo I, also clearly opposes an interpretation of LWD that would require a
87
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disclosure of structure as a requirement of patentability, and questions the existence of
written description as a distinct requirement of patentability applicable to original claims.
However, he was of the opinion that Enzo was not the appropriate case to address the
issue.93
IV.

A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF LILLY WRITTEN DESCRIPTION IN THE COURTS
AND PTO

The primary objective of this article is to provide a comprehensive survey of all
publicly available decisions of the Federal Courts and the PTO Board of Patent Appeal
and Interferences (BPAI)94 pertaining to LWD. In keeping with this objective, I pursued
a search strategy designed to be as comprehensive as reasonably possible. Details of the
search strategy are provided in the Appendix. The relatively large number of decisions
considered necessitates a succinct treatment for many of the cases. The inventions
involve complex technology, and the decisions are typically driven by the facts of the
case; readers seeking a richer understanding of some of the complex technologies at issue
in these decisions are encouraged to refer to the actual decisions and/or biotechnology
texts, treatises, and primers, of which there are many.95
In summarizing the decisions, I focus primarily upon the following issues: (1) the
extent to which the LWD is (or is not) being applied as a “super-enablement”
93
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requirement; (2) the extent to which LWD is being applied in a manner that requires a
disclosure of chemical structure, either explicitly or implicitly; and (3) the extent to
which LWD is being applied in a manner that limits claim scope, particularly for
biotechnology and/or chemical inventions. In other words, I focus upon the primary
concerns that have been expressed in connection with the effect of LWD on the ability of
biotechnology inventors to achieve adequate patent protection for their inventions.96
In Section A, I begin by summarizing the many decisions where the courts and
BPAI have rejected LWD challenges to claim validity, illustrating the extent to which
LWD is not preventing inventors from claiming biotechnology inventions in broad and/or
functional terms. Then, in Section B, I review the relatively infrequent decisions where
claims have been invalidated under LWD, pointing out the generally expansive scope of
the invalidated claims relative the scope of disclosure, and the resultant enablement
issues.
A.

Decisions Rejecting Lilly Written Description Challenges to Claim Validity

1.

LWD in the Federal Circuit
Subsequent to Lilly, the Federal Circuit has on six occasions explicitly rejected

LWD-based challenges to claims validity, with five of the six decisions involving broad
biotechnology-related claims. The first of these, Enzo II, was discussed above, and the
others are reviewed in this section.
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Amgen v. HMR, decided the year after Enzo II, involved multiple patents relating
to the cloning and expression of human erythropoietin (EPO) in recombinant, cultured
mammalian cells.97 Amgen scientists accomplished this feat by attaching a viral
promoter sequence98 adjacent to the cloned human EPO gene, and then introducing the
recombinant genetic construct into cultured Chinese Hamster Ovary (CHO) cells, which
allowed for the large scale production of this potent human therapeutic.99 In
understanding the case, it is critical to note that Amgen’s patent disclosure related to the
expression of an exogenous gene, i.e., a human gene introduced into a foreign (hamster)
cell, while the claims encompassed essentially any vertebrate cell containing a
recombinant EPO gene-promoter construct.100
The Federal Circuit upheld a district court’s determination that the claims were
not invalid under LWD.101 Note the expansive scope of the claims, and the lack of any
meaningful structural constraints. For example, the claims were found to encompass (and
to be infringed by) a human recombinant cell expressing its own native EPO gene, i.e., an
endogenous gene, as opposed to the exogenous gene described in the patent
specification.102 The recombinant expression of an endogenous human gene was not
mentioned in the patent specification, nor could it have even been accomplished using the
technology available at the time the patent application was filed, i.e, this is an “after-
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arising technology.”103 Moreover, Amgen’s patent specification pointed to "freedom
from association with human proteins" as a specific advantage of its invention, an
advantage that could only be achieved by expression of an exogenous EPO gene.104
The court’s LWD analysis is substantively indistinguishable from traditional
enablement analysis, focusing upon how “easy” it would be for one of skill in the art to
figure out how to adapt the methodology to other cell types105 (compare with “undue
experimentation” standard), and explicitly endorsing the districts court’s statement that
claims encompassing “future developments of [the] process that might alter or even
improve how the same product is made” do not violate LWD106 (compare with the same
position taken with respect to enablement in In re Fisher and Hormone Research
Foundation Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.).107 The court also finds the precedent of Lilly and
Enzo II “inapposite to this case because the claim terms at issue here are not new or
unknown biological materials” or “previously unknown DNA sequences.”108 Of course,
the claims are directed to novel recombinant cells, but the court seems suggests that
LWD is relevant only to newly discovered, naturally-occurring genetic sequences, not to
novel recombinations of genetic elements, such as the recombinant cells at issue here. As
described below, other courts have generally shared this restrictive interpretation of
LWD.
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In a strongly worded dissent, Judge Clevenger took issue with the majority’s
interpretation of LWD, pointing out that Amgen’s claims have no meaningful limitation
with respect to how the recombinant EPO is expressed, or the structure of the EPOproducing cells, so long as EPO is non-naturally occurring and produced in vertebrate
cells.109 In his view, the claims are analogous to a claim reciting any “machine that
makes polymer X, wherein the machine comprises means for controlling how much
polymer X is made.”110 He found that the majority opinion, in dismissing LWD on the
grounds that no undisclosed DNA molecule appears in the case “verges on confining Eli
Lilly to its facts.”111
It bears noting that there were a number of claims directed to recombinant EPO
protein per se which were at issue in the case but for some reason failed to trigger any
sort of LWD analysis, including claims to EPO “not isolated from human urine” or EPO
“having glycosylation pattern that differs from EPO purified from human urine.”112
These are extremely broad claims, lacking any structural limitation other than a negative
limitation, i.e., the claims encompass any and all recombinant EPO proteins, excluding
only the naturally-occurring form of the protein that was in the prior art. This clearly
invokes LWD, but the majority fails to even acknowledge the issue, and the dissent does
so only tangentially.
In Moba B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc.,113 one of only two Federal Circuit
LWD decisions not relating to biotechnology or chemistry, the court upheld a jury’s
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determination that claims directed to a machine for processing hen eggs was not invalid
for failure to comply with LWD. The decision provides a good historical description of
the development of the two distinct forms of the written description requirement, and
defines the test for compliance with either prong as essentially being one of
“possession.”114
The court also implicitly finds that, in general, the test for possession can be
shown by enablement. In particular, the court points out that in Enzo II and Amgen v.
HMR possession (and hence compliance with LWD) was satisfied by a showing of
enablement, and that likewise possession of the egg processing machine at issue in Moba
was adequately disclosed by an enabling disclosure.115 This merger of the tests for LWD
and enablement is reiterated in many subsequent cases, perhaps most explicitly in
Lizardtech.116
The next Federal Circuit decision rejecting a LWD challenge to claim validity,
Capon v. Eshhar,117 involved an appeal of the BPAI’s decision in an interference
contest.118 The claims at issue recited a genus of chimeric genes119 comprising a first
segment encoding some portion of an antibody capable of binding an antigen, and a
second segment encoding at least some portion of a protein that (1) is expressed on the
surface of cells of the immune system and (2) triggers activation and/or proliferation of
114
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the cells.120 In its decision, the BPAI presumed the claims to be enabled, but found them
to be invalid under LWD for failure of the patent specification to disclose a complete
chemical structurefor any species of chimeric gene falling within the scope of the
claims.121 The board cited Lilly and Enzo I as controlling precedent, 122 and interpreted
those decisions as requiring a specific disclosure of the chemical structure of at least one
species falling within the scope of the claim, i.e., the BPAI correctly applied LWD in
precisely the strict manner Lilly and Enzo I seemed to require.
On appeal, a unanimous panel of the Federal Circuit vacated the BPAI’s decision.
The court, citing Enzo II, specifically rejected the BPAI’s interpretation of LWD
requiring an explicit disclosure of at least one chimeric gene sequence falling within the
scope of the claim. The court found that the structures of exemplary genetic sequences
that could function as the first and second segments of the chimeric gene were known at
the time the patent application was filed, as were the structures of linker sequences and
techniques for joining the two segments by means of the linkers, and that this disclosure
was sufficient to satisfy LWD.123 In particular, the court faulted the BPAI for
interpreting LWD as requiring a “re-analysis” of known sequences, i.e., the elements of
the chimeric construct, since the structures of the elements of the chimera, including the
linker, were disclosed in the specifications and/or known in the prior art at the time of
filing.124

120

Id. at 1351-52.
This is notable as the only instance where a court or BPAI explicitly treated LWD as a super-enablement
requirement, and the decision was subsequently reversed by the Federal Circuit.
122
For some reason, the board failed to take into account the fact that Enzo I had been vacated and replaced
by Enzo II. This is somewhat strange, since the board decision is dated March 26, 2003, and Enzo II was
decided July 15, 2002.
123
Id. at 1357-58.
124
Id.
121

33

The extent of the court’s decision was fairly limited, holding that LWD did not
require an explicit disclosure of structure for any species falling within the scope of the
claim, but remanding the case to the BPAI to determine whether LWD had been satisfied
with respect to the “full scope” of the particular claim at issue. The court provided some
limited guidance to the BPAI to consider making that determination, but as was the case
in Amgen v. HMR, the criteria do not appear to differ substantively from traditional
enablement analysis. For example, the court states that, with respect to LWD, “the
determination of what is needed to support generic claims to biological subject matter
depends on a variety of factors, such as the existing knowledge in the particular field, the
extent and content of the prior art, the maturity of the science or technology, the
predictability of the aspect at issue, and other considerations appropriate to the subject
matter.”125 There is no meaningful distinction between these criteria and some of the
Wands factors, which include the state of the prior art, the relative skill of those in the art,
and the predictability or unpredictability of the art.126
Later, the court states that “the Board's repeated observation that the full scope of
all of the claims appears to be ‘enabled’ cannot be reconciled with the Board's objection
that [the claims do not satisfy LWD],” and observes that “the legal criteria of enablement
and written description are related and are often met by the same disclosure.”127 This is
yet another example of the merging of court merging the tests for enablement and LWD.
The claims at issue are expansive in scope, and lack any meaningful structural
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limitation.128 Clearly this panel of the Federal Circuit did not interpret LWD as imposing
any strict structure-based limitations on broad, functional claiming of biomolecules.
Shortly after Capon, the Federal Circuit decided Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech
Laboratories,129 where the patented invention at issue in involved the genetic engineering
of a functionally modified form of a protein known as a reverse transcriptase (RT). RTs
are naturally-occurring enzymes that possess two distinct catalytic activities, referred to
as the DNA polymerase and the RNase H activities. 130 Invitrogen scientists discovered
that by deleting a section of the RT protein (using a technique known as deletion
mutagenesis) they could make RT*, an RT variant that retains DNA polymerase activity,
albeit with substantially reduced RNase activity.131 This variant proved superior to
natural RT in a variety of molecular biology applications, i.e., RT* is useful as a research
tool. Based on the disclosure of a single example of an RT*,132 derived from a specific
strain of retrovirus and generated by a specific methodology, they obtained a patent
covering any RT*, derived from any retrovirus, yeast, Neurospora, Drosophila, primate
or rodent, generated by any methodology, including functionally distinct or superior
variants.133
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Clontech made its own version of RT* by a different technique, known as point
mutagenesis.134 Clearly, the different techniques would lead to structurally distinct
products, and perhaps to different function.135 In particular, it might well be the case that
the product of point mutagenesis might have superior function relative to the product of
deletion mutagenesis. Clontech argued that the Invitrogen patent application did not
disclose or enable the production of RT* by point mutagenesis, and that the claims should
be interpreted as not encompassing their RT* made by point mutagenesis or, in the
alternative, if interpreted broadly enough as to encompass their product, the claims are
invalid for violation of LWD. In particular, Clontech argued that the claim violated
LWD for describing the claimed genus of RT* molecules in essentially functional terms,
with no meaningful structural limitation.136
The district court held on a motion for summary judgment that the claim was not
invalid under LWD, and the Federal Circuit affirmed that decision. The Federal Circuit
acknowledged that the claimed genus of RT* proteins was defined solely in terms of
function, but held that there was a sufficient, known relationship between the structure
and function of retroviral RTs to satisfy LWD.137 However, in this regard the court’s
focus appears to be misdirected, for the claim do not recite naturally-occurring retroviral
RTs, but non-naturally occurring RT*s from a variety of species, of which only a single
embodiment was disclosed. Beyond that limited disclosure, there is no evidence in the
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record of any disclosure of a relationship between structure and function in other species
of RT*, and in particular no suggestion of disclosure which would allow one to produce a
RT* variant by point mutagenesis such as the one produced by Clontech. The claim
literally covers improved RT* variants sharing little structural similarity with the
disclosed RT* and substantially distinct and/or superior functional characteristics. In this
case, LWD is simply not functioning as any meaningful limitation on claim scope.
Note also that while an enablement challenge to the claim’s validity was also
rejected, the court could have easily found the broad claim invalid for lack of enablement
by applying that requirement in the stringent manner to be observed in cases like Amgen
v. Chugai.138 In fact, by comparison the claim invalidated in Amgen v. Chugai was
actually much narrower than the claim in Invitrogen. The Amgen claim was limited to
EPO variants having “duplicative” function with respect to the disclosed EPO, while the
claims in Invitrogen literally cover functionally distinct and/or improved variations of the
disclosed RT*. Likewise, the Amgen claim is implicitly limited to variants of a single
disclosed EPO, while the claim in Invitrogen literally encompasses RT* variants derived
from any of a wide range of organisms, including organisms for which the RT protein
had yet to be characterized.
The court attempted to reconcile its decision with previous LWD decisions,
noting, for example, that in Lilly not one single structure was provided for a sequence
falling within the claims, while in this case a single structure was provided.139 However,
on this point the court misreads Lilly; recall that in Lilly a claim directed to the genus of
mammalian insulin genes was found invalid under LWD even though the structure of the
138
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rat gene was disclosed, i.e., a species falling within the scope of the claim. A more
principled distinction between the two cases, which the Invitrogen court did not explicitly
make, is that in Lilly the genus encompassed naturally occurring genetic sequences, while
in Invitrogen the claim is directed to a genus of non-naturally occurring, synthetically
derived biomolecules.140
Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis involved another appeal of a BPAI interference
decision.141 Inglis’s patent specification described a method of making a safer attenuated
virus vaccine that involved deleting an essential gene from the viral genome, and
producing the virus in a host cell expressing the essential gene (and thereby providing the
function of the essential gene necessary for the viability of the modified virus). The
patent specification specifically described and exemplified the invention with respect to
herpes virus. However, the specification included some passing references to a variety of
other types of viruses, including poxvirus,142 and a brief statement that the disclosed
methods were not limited to herpes virus vaccines, but could also be applied generally to
other viruses.143
Subsequent to the initial filing date, Inglis filed patent claims specifically directed
to poxvirus vaccines generated by the methodology, claiming priority to the originally
filed patent specification. In particular, Inglis claimed any vaccine comprising a
defective poxvirus whose genome had been modified by deletion of an essential gene the
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function of which could be replaced by a host cell expressing the gene.144 The question
on appeal was whether the original patent specification, with its limited disclosure with
regard to poxvirus, provided adequate support for the claim to satisfy LWD. Falkner
argued that it did not, pointing out that the specification provided no specific example of
a poxvirus vaccine and no specific teaching with respect to how one would make a
poxvirus vaccine falling within the scope of the claim, or any teaching regarding the
genome of poxvirus or the identification of essential genes.145 In fact, the specification
stated that as of the date the specification was filed no poxvirus vaccine had ever been
made.146
However, the Federal Circuit found that the claim complied with LWD, pointing
out that the structures of some poxviruses and their essential regions were known to a
PHOSITA, and citing Capon for the proposition that LWD does not require the “reanalysis” of known structures.147 However, the claim is not limited to only known
poxviruses, but literally extends to any poxvirus, including as of yet undiscovered strains
of poxvirus. The specification does not provide any structural description for the massive
number of unreported poxvirus, nor does it specifically identify the essential regions of
the poxvirus genome whose function could be provided by growth of virus in a host cell
expressing that region. Essentially, the court finds that information in the public domain
at the time the application was filed would have enabled a PHOSITA to make some
species falling within the scope of the claim, and this was enough to satisfy LWD.
According tot the court, LWD does not require a structure for any species falling within
144
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the scope of the claim, nor does it require the actual production of any species falling
within the scope of the claim i.e., actual reduction of practice is not required.
With regard to claim scope, the court merely points to the fact that a number of
poxviruses and their essential genes were known to the PHOSITA, without ever
explicitly addressing the scope of the claim relative to scope of disclosure, or the lack of
meaningful structural limitation on the claim. In Lilly, the court seemed to require that a
broad genus claim to genetic sequences be supported by a representative number of
samples, or by the identification of common structural features that distinguish the
claimed genus. However, in Falkner the court specifically rejects the notion that any
specific examples are required to support a broad genus claim, and finds that the
knowledge of some relationship between structure and function in species falling within
the scope of the claim is sufficient to satisfy LWD, without engaging in any analysis
regarding the scope of the claims relative to the limited number of species for which any
relationship between structure and function was known.148
In view of the breadth of the claim and lack of structural limitation, the claim
could have been found invalid for insufficient enablement. The poxvirus family is vast,
including numerous distinct viruses capable of infecting vertebrates and invertebrates.149
The classification poxvirus would also presumably encompass the many poxvirus species
that have yet to be discovered and/or characterized,150 hence the claims cover vaccines
against viruses not even known at the time the application was filed, and vaccines with
substantially superior function, none of which could have been made based on the
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original disclosure without engaging in undue experimentation. For example, in In re
Wright, a similar broad claim directed to viral vaccines was found overly broad and
hence invalid for lack of enablement.151
2.

LWD in the District Courts
My search identified ten district court decisions, not the subject of a subsequently

reported appellate decision, wherein the court rejected LWD challenges to claim validity.
Each case is discussed in this section. Three of the cases involved a determination by the
court after a bench trial, and seven involved a denial of a motion for summary judgment.
In one of the decisions denying a defendant’s motion for summary judgment of
invalidity, the court also granted patentee’s summary judgment motion with regard to
LWD, finding the claims to satisfy LWD as a matter of law.
In Streck v. Beckman Coulter, the defendant argued on motion for summary
judgment that a claim reciting “analogs or surrogates” for white blood cells failed to
satisfy LWD.152 The district court rejected this argument, holding that the “claim is not
so devoid of clarity that there is no means by which those skilled in the art could
ascertain the scope of the claim.”153 In basing its decision on the clarity of the claim, the
court appears to have blurred the line between LWD and the definiteness requirement of
35 USC 112, second paragraph. The court also posited that LWD is restricted to genetic
sequences and biotechnology inventions, and in not applicable to cells.154
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In Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs,155 the claim at issue was directed to a chimeric gene
comprising two elements: (1) a promoter sequence derived from a cauliflower mosaic
virus (CaMV),156 and (2) a “structural sequence which is heterologous with respect to the
promoter.”157 The CaMV promoter element was defined so as to generically encompass
two classes of promoters that are associated with many of the virus’s genes (in particular,
the CaMV 35S and 19S promoters).158 Thus, the definition includes a large genus of
genetic sequences, unrestrained by any explicit structural limitation. The second element
of the chimeric gene could essentially be any gene, from any source, that does not occur
naturally in association with the CaMV promoter element. The claim scope is very
broad, analogous to the chimeric gene claim at issue in Capon. In granting a Monsanto
motion for summary judgment, the district court held that the disclosure of a few species
falling within the scope of the claim satisfied LWD as a matter of law, thus anticipating
the Federal Circuit’s decision in Capon.
In Regents of University of California v. Monsanto Co., the district court denied a
motion for summary judgment seeking to invalidate a claim directed to a specific
nucleotide sequence for failure to comply with LWD.159 The motion was based on the
defendant’s assertion that the claim listed the wrong DNA sequence.160 In denying the
motion, the judge noted that the alleged error resulted in a silent mutation, so would not
change the sequence of the protein encoded by the gene, and that in any event the
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patentee had made a deposit of the claimed sequence accessible to the public, which
under Enzo II satisfies LWD.161
In Pfizer Inc. v. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd.,162 the defendant Ranbaxy argued that
the patent claims, which recited a molecule defined in terms of a generic chemical
formula, should be interpreted narrowly as only covering racemic mixtures of the
molecule.163 Because they proposed marketing a purified enantiomer of the molecule,
under this construction they would not have infringed the patent.164 In the alternative,
they argued that if the claims were interpreted broadly so as to encompass purified
enantiomers, the claim was invalid under LWD for failure to individually describe
specific enantiomers of the claimed compounds, and for failure to disclose any method
for making the enantiomers.165 In a bench trial, the district court rejected this argument,
pointing out that the patent specification expressly indicates that the generic formula
includes all trans-enantiomers and that methods of resolving racemates into their
respective enantiomers are well known to one of skill in the art.166 Thus, the court
interpreted LWD as not requiring an explicit disclosure of structure, and gave the claims
a broad reading. Pfizer v. Ranbaxy is notable in that it is the only decision, in either the
courts of BPAI, wherein the issue of LWD was even raised in connection with a product
claim directed to a chemical entity other than a biomolecule.
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In Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 167 the defendant moved for
summary judgment that a claim directed to a method of treatment was invalid under
LWD for defining a chemical therapeutic agent in purely functional terms.168 The claim
is closely analogous to the claim at issue in Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle,169 as are
the defendant’s arguments in the two cases. However, in Boston Scientific the patent
specification discloses a number of chemical therapeutic agents possessing the claimed
function, as well as an assay to identify other compounds possessing the desired function,
whereas in Rochester the specification failed to specifically identify a single compound
possessing the required function.170 Based on this distinction, the district court denied
defendant’s motion, holding that the issue of LWD was one of fact that could not be
decided on summary judgment.
In Kao Corp. v. Unilever U.S., Inc., the court in a bench trial held that claims
directed to compositions and methods for unclogging skin pores were not invalid for
inadequate LWD.171
In Enzo Life Sciences, Inc. v. Digene Corp., defendant Digene argued on a motion
for summary judgment that claims directed to a diagnostic methods involving the
detection of a complex of hybridized nucleic acids comprising a “signaling domain” or a
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“capturing domain” were invalid under LWD.172 In particular, Digene focused on the
lack of any ordinary meaning for the terms “signaling domain” and “capturing domain,”
the failure of the specification to provide any definition for the terms, and the fact that the
nucleic acids were defined in purely functional terms.173 Digene especially focused on
the fact that the functional definition occurred at the point of novelty in the invention, i.e.,
the use of “signaling and capturing domains.”174 The court denied the motion for
summary judgment, holding that the question of compliance with LWD was one of fact
inappropriate for summary determination. In support of its decision, the court pointed to
a purported PHOSITA’s declaration proffered by Enzo. The declaration identified
various sections of the specification which indicated that one skilled in the art "would
immediately recognize that the inventions claimed in [the patent] are fully described by
the specification.”175 The court also rejected a motion for summary judgment on behalf
of Enzo to find the patent not invalid under LWD, again finding that the determination
involved a factual dispute unsuitable for summary disposition.176
In Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. Eon Labs Mfg., Inc., a generic drug manufacturer
moved for a summary judgment determination that claims directed to a sustained release
version of the popular anti-depressant Wellbutrin were invalid under LWD177. The claim
recited formulations comprising HPMC, which is a generic designation for a genus of
related molecular polymers. The substance of the LWD challenge sounded in
enablement, with the defendant essentially arguing that the specification failed to
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demonstrate that certain species falling within the claimed genus could actually be used
to make a functional sustained release formulation.178 The court rejected the motion,
pointing to an affidavit submitted by Glaxo’s expert stating that all versions of the
polymer falling within the claimed genus would be capable of performing the desired
function of forming a hydrogel and retarding release of the active ingredient from a
sustained release matrix, which raised an issue of fact with respect to LWD
compliance.179
In Scanner Technologies Corp. v. Icos Vision Systems Corp., N.V., the court
denied a LWD-based summary judgment challenge to a patent involving technology and
processes to inspect electronic components, such as "ball array devices," which are used
to conduct electrical impulses in electronic devices, citing the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact.180
In Genlyte Thomas Group LLC v. National Service Industries, Inc., the court
denied a motion on summary judgment to invalidate claims directed to a “recessed
lighting feature” for failure to comply with LWD. 181 The substance of the challenge
implicates the definiteness requirement of 35 USC 112, second paragraph, rather than
LWD, with the defendant alleging that the term “plastic,” as used in the claims was “too
general to be useful.”182
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Astra Aktiebolag v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc., involved generic drug
companies seeking to invalidate patents claiming formulations of Prilosec,183 alleging
that the claims were invalid for failure to comply with LWD with regard to a number of
terms used in the claims.184 In a bench trial, the court rejected all LWD-based challenges
to the claims.
3.

LWD in the BPAI
My search identified 22 BPAI decisions, not the subject of a subsequently

reported appellate decision addressing the LWD issue, wherein the board reversed an
examiner’s LWD rejection. Each decision is discussed in this section, with cases grouped
to some extent based on similarity of the claimed subject matter and pertinent issues of
patentability.
a. The Use of Open-Ended “Comprising” Language
Inventors of novel biomolecules frequently broaden the scope of patent coverage
by using “comprising” language to claim the molecule.185 For example, a claim directed
to a polynucleotide “comprising” a specified DNA sequence is understood to encompass
any larger DNA sequence that includes within its length the specifically disclosed
sequence.186 Such claims are very broad in the sense that there are infinite possibilities
for modification at either end of the recited sequence, and all of these variants would fall
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within the scope of the claim.187 Perhaps more problematic from a policy perspective, the
use of comprising language allows the discoverer of only a fragment of a naturallyoccurring protein or polynucleotide to obtain a patent claim literally covering the fulllength protein or polynucleotide, as well as any larger construct comprising the fulllength molecule, such as a protein fusion or gene chimera.
Some patent examiners have attempted to use LWD to thwart this approach,
asserting that the disclosure of a biomolecule sequence does not support a claim
encompassing biomolecules having additions to one or both ends of the disclosed
sequence, particularly additions that might very well confer function not possessed by the
originally disclosed sequence. However, in the single BPAI decision I identified that
addresses the issue, Ex parte Fisher, the board found that this use of comprising language
generally does not raise LWD as an issue.188
In Fisher, the board reversed an examiner’s LWD rejection of claims directed to
any polynucleotide comprising a recited EST sequence,189 concluding (without
explanation) that the disclosure of a specified sequence was enough to satisfy LWD for
any molecule comprising that sequence.190 The board chose instead to invalidate the
claims for lack of utility, a decision ultimately affirmed by the Federal Circuit.191 Of
course, a problem with reliance on utility instead of LWD (or enablement) is that in cases
where an EST does have some utility, the comprising language will still be available to
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leverage the discovery of a gene fragment into patent coverage for the full-length gene
(and the vast number of other genetic variants that might also include the sequence).
b. Percent Identity Claims
Inventors of novel biomolecules typically seek patent claims encompassing not
only that specific sequence, but also a broad genus of structurally and/or functionally
related variants. When used in conjunction with comprising language, as is almost
always the case, such claims can be truly astronomical in scope.
One of the most common approaches to achieving expansive scope of coverage
around a disclosed biomolecule is to claim all molecules sharing some defined percent
identity (or percent similarity) to the specific sequence actually discovered. 192 An
example would be a claim reciting “a protein comprising an amino acid sequence sharing
at least 90% identity with the amino acid sequence of SEQ ID NO. 1.”193
The PTO’s Synopsis of Application of Written Description Guidelines (referred to
herein as the “Written Description Guidelines,” or simply the “Guidelines”)194
specifically sanction the use of percent identity claims of a reasonable scope.195
However, patent examiners routinely reject what they perceive to be overly broad percent
identity claims for violation of LWD.196 For example, in a typical scenario, a patent
applicant files a patent application claiming all proteins sharing at least 70% identity to a
recited amino acid sequence, the examiner rejects the claim for violation of LWD (and
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typically also the enablement requirement), and after some negotiation the examiner will
allow a narrower claim amended to recite proteins sharing at least 90% identity to the
recited sequence. There is substantial examiner-to-examiner variation with respect to the
stringency with which written description is applied to percent identity claims, with some
examiners essentially refusing to allow percent identity claims no matter how narrow,
others allowing extremely broad claims (e.g., 50% identity, or even less), and many
allowing what they determine to be a reasonable scope of coverage, as illustrated by the
example where a compromise was reached by the applicant amending the percent identity
term to recite 90% instead of 70% identity. In many cases, the examiner will allow
broader scope of coverage (a lower percent identity term) in cases where the applicant
discloses some relationship between the biomolecule’s structure and function.197
Reflecting this disparate treatment, a survey of issued biomolecule patents will reveal a
wide range of percent identity terms, varying from 99% to 50% or lower.198
In contrast, the BPAI has been very consistent when it comes to LWD rejections
of percent identity claims - my research identified six decisions wherein the board
reversed an examiner’s LWD rejection of a percent identity claim, and not a single
instance where such a rejection was affirmed.
The earliest percent identity LWD decision that I identified is Ex parte Sun.199
The rejected claim recited an “isolated Wee1 nucleic acid comprising . . . a Wee1
polynucleotide having at least 80% identity to the entire coding region of SEQ ID NO:
1.” The examiner pointed out that the patent specification failed to disclose a single
197
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example of a Wee1 variant retaining the activity of Wee1 and sharing only 80% identity
with the reference sequence, and argued that the “specification does not set forth what
specific structural or physical features define the claimed isolated nucleic acids,” and that
one skilled in the art “could not predict the structure and function of isolated nucleic
acids comprising a Wee1 polynucleotide having at least 80% identity to the entire coding
region of SEQ ID NO:1.” This would seem to be a valid application of LWD as a superenablement requirement, focusing on claim breadth, lack of structural definition and lack
of representative examples. Nevertheless, the board reversed the LWD rejection, citing
Enzo II and holding that the disclosure of the single reference sequence and methodology
for screening for variants having Wee1 activity was sufficient to satisfy the LWD
requirement.
Then, in Ex parte Bandman et al. (Bandman I) 200 and Ex Parte Au-Young et
al.,201 the board reversed LWD rejections of claims encompassing any “naturallyoccurring” polynucleotide encoding an amino acid sequence sharing 90% identity to a
disclosed reference sequence.202 In both cases, the examiners’ rejections were based on a
determination that the disclosure provided no guidance as to how the sequences of
naturally-occurring alleles could be distinguished from non-naturally occurring
sequences, and no way to predict they would all have function. The Board disagreed,
finding that 90% identity and naturally occurring were enough to adequately describe the
genus, even without a functional limitation. Note that the examiners rejection was based

200

Appeal No. 2003-1805, Application No. 09/079,892 at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd031805.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
201
Appeal No. 2003-1817, Application No. 09/501,714 at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd031817.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
202
In Bandman I, the examiner had allowed a claim to the genus of polynucleotides having at least 90%
identity to a reference sequence and retaining the functional activity of the reference sequence.

51

on the same rationale used by the Federal Circuit in Amgen v. Chugai when it found a
biomolecule claim invalid for lack of enablement.203
In Ex parte Meyers,204 the board reversed the LWD rejection of a claim
encompassing all nucleotide sequences having at least 70% identity with the reference
sequence and encoding a polypeptide having dehydrogenase activity. Not only is the
70% identity term broad in a structural sense, the functional limitation itself is very
broad. The term “dehydrogenase activity” does not refer to single, specific function, but
rather is a generic term referring to the chemical reactions catalyzed by a large family of
diverse proteins involved in a variety of physiological pathways.205
In Ex parte Bandman et al. (Bandman II),206 the board reversed the LWD
rejection of a claim encompassing any “isolated polynucleotide encoding a polypeptide . .
. comprising a naturally-occurring amino acid sequence at least 95% identical to the
amino acid sequence of SEQ ID NO:1.” The Examiner supported the rejection by
pointing out that the specification provided only a single representative sequence and “no
disclosure of any particular structure to function/activity relationship in the single
disclosed species.” The Board was not convinced, faulting the examiner for failing to
provide adequate explanation or evidence to support the assertion that the specification
failed to disclose any structure to function/activity relationship. Upon review of the
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specification, it appears that the examiner’s assertion was correct, in that there is no
specific discussion of correlation between structure and function.
Most recently, in Ex parte Smith207 the board reversed the LWD rejection of a
claim reciting a method that included a step of “adding isolated viral reaper protein
having at least 50% sequence similarity to SEQ ID NO:2 and capable of inducing caspase
activation in a vertebrate cell.”208 Note that typically protein genuses are defined in terms
of percent “identity;” not “similarity.” Similarity encompasses not only identical
residues, but also conservative amino acid substitutions, so the genus in this case is much
broader than even 50% identity. Nonetheless, even 50% identity would be quite broad,
with 70% identity usually being considered a rough cut-off for detecting homology
between proteins. The board seemed to be impressed by the fact that in this case the
specification described 15 variants of the reference viral reaper protein, sharing between
62%-87% similarity to the reference sequence. In the view of the board, this information
amounted to a description of a relationship between structure and function, which under
Enzo II can be used to satisfy the LWD requirement in the absence of a literal disclosure
of structure.
c. Hybridization Claims
Another commonly used technique for achieving broad genus coverage of a
polynucleotide is by means of a “hybridization claim,” i.e., a claim that encompasses any
polynucleotide capable of hybridizing to a reference sequence, or the reference
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sequence’s complement.209 In as sense, hybridization is a proxy for percent identity,
because there is a correlation between the degree of percent identity between two
polynucleotide sequences and their ability to hybridize to one another.210
As is the case with percent identity claims, the Written Description Guidelines
specifically sanction the use of percent identity claims, at least where the claim recites
relatively high stringency hybridization conditions.211 However, an examiner will often
invoke the LWD requirement to reject a hybridization claim which she feels is overly
broad, such as in cases where the claim recites relatively low or moderate stringency
hybridization conditions.
In my review of BPAI decisions, I found two cases where the board reversed
rejections of hybridization claims, and no instance where such a rejection was affirmed.
In Ex parte Herrmann et al.,212 the board reversed a LWD rejection of a claim that
encompassed any polynucleotide capable of hybridizing to any of a large number of
reference polynucleotide sequences under defined hybridization conditions.213
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In the other hybridization decision, Ex parte Chung et al.,214 the board reversed a
LWD rejection of a claim reciting a genus of isolated nucleic acids defined essentially in
terms of three criteria: (1) percent identity to a disclosed reference sequence, (2) the
ability to hybridize to the reference sequence, and (3) the correspondence of the nucleic
acid to an mRNA differentially expressed in certain types of cancerous tissues. The
claim is analogous to Example 9 in the Written Description Guidelines, the main
difference being that in Example 9 the functional limitation relates to the function of a
protein encoded by the nucleic acid, while in this case the functional limitation relates to
differential mRNA expression in carcinoma tissue.215 The Examiner felt that this
difference brought the claim out of compliance with LWD, but the Board disagreed,
noting that in both cases the “functional” limitation could be determined by testing.
In support of the LWD rejection, the examiner argued that the functional
characteristic of the genus (differential expression, which is not really a function) was
“uncoupled with the structure of the claimed genus.” However, the Board found that
examiner had not explained why that matters; i.e., the board fails to even acknowledge
the role of chemical structure in compliance with LWD.
d.

Fragment Claims
Another claiming technique for obtaining broad genus coverage around a

disclosed biomolecule is to claim any biomolecule comprising some relatively short
fragment (i.e., segment) of the disclosed protein or nucleic acid sequence. Because of the
power of “comprising” language in patent claims, discussed above, these fragment claims
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can result in extremely broad genus coverage surrounding the disclosed biomolecule. For
example, a typical disclosed protein might be made up of 300 amino acids. A claim to
any protein comprising any 10 contiguous amino acid sequence of the molecule would be
infringed by any protein sharing at least one stretch of 10 contiguous amino acids; any
and all of the remaining 290 amino acids could be altered, and amino acids could be
added or deleted. The claim could cover proteins that are almost totally unrelated (other
than the short 10 amino acid fragment), including as of yet undiscovered proteins never
contemplated by the inventor and having vastly different functional properties than the
disclosed biomolecule.
In three of the BPAI decisions that I found in my search the board considered
LWD rejections of fragment claims, and in all three cases the board reversed these
rejections. For example, in Ex parte McElroy et al.,216 the board reversed a LWD
rejection of a polynucleotide fragment claim, specifically, a claim directed to fragments
of a promoter sequence. The inventors had discovered a 3536 base long stretch of
genetic sequence containing somewhere within its length a promoter sequence.
Recognizing that not all of the 3536 bases were required for promoter activity, they
claimed any polynucleotide comprising at least 95 contiguous bases of the disclosed
promoter sequence and retaining the promoter activity. The examiner’s LWD rejection
was based on the lack of disclosure of any structure-function correlation that would allow
one to predict which 95 contiguous base fragments would retain promoter function and
which would not. However, the Board held that no disclosure of structure-function
correlation was required to satisfy the LWD requirement. The disclosure of the 3536
216
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base reference sequence inherently included the disclosure of each 95 base fragment, and
according to the board this was all that was required to satisfy the LWD requirement.
In Ex parte Hermann et al., a claim covering any “polynucleotide encoding a
protein comprising an amino-terminal fragment of [a disclosed amino acid sequence]”
was rejected for violation of the LWD requirement, and the board reversed.217
More recently, in Ex parte Friedberg et al.,218 the board reversed a LWD rejection
of claims to fragments of a protein. The inventor had discovered a novel protein
(hundreds of amino acids in length) and claimed any isolated polypeptide comprising at
least 10 contiguous amino acids of the protein’s sequence. The case tracks the facts of Ex
parte McElroy; the examiner found the claim to violate LWD for failing to identify which
of the 10 contiguous amino acid sequences were involved in the protein’s function, but
the board rejected this argument, finding that since the full length protein sequence was
disclosed, inherently all of the 10 amino acid segments are also described. The board did
not consider function at all in its LWD analysis.
Note that in sanctioning this claiming strategy, the BPAI is opening up the door to
very broad claims encompassing much larger molecules that are not described by the
specification, have not been actually reduced to practice, and have not been made
available by deposit. The approach is clearly at odds with the policy concerns which
gave raise to LWD. In fact, if the patentee in Lilly itself had used this approach, and
claimed any polynucleotide comprising some fragment of the disclosed rat insulin gene,

217

See supra at note 212.
Appeal No. 2004-2314, Application No. 09/971,101, at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd042314.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
218

57

the claim would have likely encompassed the human insulin gene, based on the high
degree of homology between the two sequences.219
e.

Genetic Constructs and Protein Fusions
One of the methodologies that define biotechnology is genetic engineering, which

includes the splicing together of DNA sequences from divergent sources to form genetic
constructs that do not otherwise exist in nature. For example, genetic engineering can be
used to link promoter and gene sequences that that are not naturally associated with one
another, thereby placing gene expression under the control of a foreign promoter.
Similar technology can be used to fuse together genetic sequences coding for elements of
two or more distinct protein precursors. The expression product of such a gene chimera
is a protein fusion, a single protein formed from the covalent combination of elements
derived from two or more distinct protein precursors.220 I identified several BPAI
decisions wherein the board reversed LWD rejections of claims directed to chimeric
genes and/or fusion proteins.
In Ex parte Fischetti,221the board reversed the rejection of a claim directed to a
fusion protein comprising a “carrier” protein linked to some segment of a known protein,
i.e., the “conserved exposed region of the M protein of group A streptococci.” The
“carrier” protein element of the fusion protein is defined solely in terms of function,
while the protein segment element, it is defined as encompassing any segment of the
protein ranging in length from 5 to 130 amino acids. The examiner pointed out that the
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specification failed to provide any guidance as to how one might distinguish between
functional and non-functional segments,222 but the board found that the disclosure of
structure or structure-function relationship was in this case not required to satisfy LWD.
In Ex parte Evans et al.,223 the board reversed a LWD rejection of a claim reciting
cells containing exogenous DNA encoding “functional steroid receptor proteins”
operably linked to a control sequence (i.e., a promoter). Both elements of the chimera are
defined very broadly and in terms of function, without any structural description. In
particular, the genus of “functional steroid receptor proteins” encompasses a large family
of diverse proteins. There are many different types of steroids, many proteins which bind
them, and these proteins can respond in a variety of complex ways to the binding of a
steroid. Not only does the claim encompass a large number of proteins known at the time
of the invention, but many that had yet to be discovered. For example, there is no
limitation with respect to the source of the protein; it could be derived from any
organism, or could be a synthetic protein that does not even exist in nature. The promoter
element is even broader, defined as it is solely in functional terms.
In Ex parte Griffiths et al.,224 a representative claim recites a method that
comprises administering to a patient a bispecific (i.e., chimeric) antibody and an F-18
labeled peptide. The claim specifies that the antibody comprises an arm that is specific to
a target tissue of the patient and another arm that is specific to the F-18-labeled peptide.
The specification and claims impose no structural restrictions on the peptides, and the
222
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chimeric antibody is defined solely in terms of function. The specification does provide
the structure of three exemplary peptides that work. The examiner rejected the claim
under LWD, arguing that the three peptide species were insufficient to adequately
describe the entire genuses of peptides and bispecific antibodies falling within the scope
of the claims, and for lack of enablement. The Board reversed both rejections.
And most recently, in Ex parte Peoples et al.,225 the board reversed a LWD
rejection of a claim directed to any proteins fusion made by linking two or more proteins
derived from any of the following families of proteins: -ketothiolases, acyl-CoA
reductases, PHA synthases, PHB synthetases, phasins, enoyl-CoA hydratases and betahydroxyacyl-ACP::coenzyme-A transferases. These classifications are based solely on
the physiological functions of the proteins falling within the family, and do not imply any
structural limitation upon the claim. The claim is also exceedingly broad; each of these
families includes a large number of distinct proteins, including proteins of diverse
function and as-of-yet undiscovered proteins.
f.

Functionally Claimed Proteins
In Ex parte Tully et al.,226 the board reversed a LWD rejection of a claim to a

method for assessing the effect of a drug on long term memory formation comprising a
step of determining “functional levels” of certain “activator or repressor” proteins. The
proteins are defined broadly and in functional terms. The examiner noted that the
specification failed to provide structural guidance with respect to how one would
distinguish between proteins falling within the claim versus those outside the claim. As
225
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pointed out by the examiner, known proteins falling within the scope of the claim shared
little structural similarity (approximately 18% “homology”), and the claim would
presumably encompass as yet undiscovered proteins.
g.

Functional Protein Variants
In Invitrogen v. Clontech, the Federal Circuit held that the disclosure of a single

genetically-engineered functional variant of a known protein was sufficient to provide
adequate written description to support a claim encompassing essentially any engineered
variant of the protein sharing the modified function. My search identified two BPAI
decisions that reach a similar conclusion.
In Ex parte Bornscheuer et al.,227 the board reversed a LWD rejection of a claim
directed to a method for altering the function of a protein by random mutation of the gene
encoding the protein228 and selecting for a mutation that results in a desirable alteration in
the protein’s function. The claim is not limited to a particular protein, but encompasses
any protein falling within the scope of “lipases, amidases, nitrilases, ether hydrolases,
peroxidases, glycosidases and phytases.” These are all functionally defined families of
enzymes;229 not only is there no structural limitation, but the claim scope is expansive,
since each family comprises a diverse collection of functionally distinct enzymes. In
support of the rejection, the examiner specifically cited the huge scope of the claim (the
use of “any enzyme and any substrate” to produce a new enzyme (emphasis in original))
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and the failure of the specification to describe a “correlation between the structures and
functions of the reagents used in the methods.”
In Ex parte Anderson et al.,230 the BPAI reversed a LWD rejection of a claim
directed to any mutant of a specified cellulase protein having “endoglucanase activity.”
Naturally occurring cellulases, including the specified cellulase, do not normally have
endoglucanase activity, and the invention was the successful creation of a single cellulase
mutant having the desired activity. However, based on the limited disclosure of a single
mutant the inventor claimed any mutant having this desired function, with the only
structural limitation being that the mutant must have a histidine at a specified position in
the amino acid sequence.231 In rejecting the claim, the examiner pointed out the extreme
breadth of the claim in relation to the disclosure. For example, the cellulase protein
comprises 200 amino acids, and the claim only specifies the identity of one of these (the
histidine). The claim encompasses “variants mutated at any of said 200 amino acid
residues,” and provides no guidance with respect to which of these variants would
possess the desired function other than the disclosure of a single example. The board
explicitly interpreted the claim as encompassing any modifications of the cellulase,
“wherein the modifications may be substitutions, insertions or deletions, with the proviso
that the resulting cellulose [sic] have endoglucanase activity,” but nonetheless found the
claim to comply with LWD.
h.

DNA Sequence Coding for a Structurally Undefined Protein
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In Ex parte Knauf et al.,232 the board reversed a LWD rejection of a claim
covering the genus of cDNA sequences encoding “the mature protein encoding portion”
of a specifically recited protein. The structure of the protein is not provided, but the
claim does recite an approximate molecular weight of the “mature protein.” The claim is
intended to encompass structural variants of the protein, including the “Type I” and
“Type II” forms. The specification does appear to disclose the structure for at least one
cDNA sequence falling within the scope of the claim, which would distinguish this case
from the Federal Circuits decision in In re Wallach, discussed below.233 Still, as the
doctrine is interpreted by the BPAI in this decision, LWD does not seem to impose any
structural limitation on claim scope, so long as at least one structure falling within the
scope of the claim is disclosed.
i.

Functionally-Defined Synthetic Biomolecules
In Ex parte Usman et al.,234 the BPAI reversed a LWD rejection of a claim

reciting a “pharmaceutical composition, comprising: at least one enzymatic nucleic acid
molecule having a ribonucleotide at a catalytically critical site, at least one
deoxyribonucleotide and at least one nucleic acid analog; and a pharmaceutically
acceptable carrier.”235
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The scope of this claim is particularly expansive, the range of potential enzymatic
activities is virtually limitless, and the claim covers any nucleic acid molecule having any
enzymatic function, so long as it contains at least one each of a ribonucleotide, a
dexoyribonucleotide, and a nucleic acid analog. The specification provides no guidance
with respect to correlation between structure and enzymatic function.
j. Hybrid and Recombinant Plants and Seeds
In Ex parte Griffith,236 the BPAI reversed a LWD rejection of a claim directed to
the genus of “any and all hybrid corn seeds, and the hybrid corn plants produced by
growing said hybrid seeds, wherein the hybrid seeds are produced by crossing [a
specifically disclosed, novel inbred corn line] with any second, distinct inbred corn
plant.” The examiner argued that since half of the genomes of the claimed hybrids are
derived from a second, non-specified inbred corn plant, the specification failed to provide
adequate description to support the claims.
Likewise, the examiner rejected claims directed to variants of the disclosed inbred
corn line that had been transformed to include a transgene in the plants genome, again for
failing to describe the nature of the transgene. This rejection was also reversed by the
board.
B.

Decisions Upholding Lilly Written Description Challenges to Claim Validity
In the preceding section, the conventional view that LWD has dramatically

restricted the ability of biotechnology inventors to claim their inventions is refuted by the
large number of cases where the courts and BPAI have declined to apply LWD in such as
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restrictive manner. In this section I will review all of the decisions I identified wherein
the courts or BPAI have found claims to be invalid under LWD. In view of the outcry
over Lilly, it might come as a surprise to some that in the nine years since the decision
there have been so few reported judicial decisions where claims have actually been
invalidated under LWD. In fact, there are only four Federal Circuit decisions,237 and a
single district court decision (that was not subsequently the subject of a reported appellate
decision).
1.

LWD in the Federal Circuit
The first post-Lilly Federal Circuit decision wherein a patent claim failed to

satisfy LWD was Noelle v. Lederman, an appeal of a BPAI decision in an interference
contest.238 Noelle had successfully isolated a monoclonal antibody (mAb) capable of
binding the mouse antigen CD40CR (i.e., a “mouse mAb”),239 and deposited the mAb
with the ATCC, a publicly accessible depository for biological samples. Based on this
disclosure of the mouse mAb, Noelle attempted to obtain a claim encompassing any mAb
capable of binding the human analog of the CD40CR antigen (the “human mAb”), and
another claim directed generically to any mAb capable of binding CD40CR from any
species possessing the antigen. Noelle did not provide the structure for the deposited
mAb, or any mAb falling within the scope of the claim, nor did he provide a structural
description of the mouse CD40CR antigen, or CD40CR antigen from human or any other
species.
237
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The BPAI found that deposit of a single mouse mAb constituted sufficient
disclosure to support a broad claim encompassing any mouse mAb .240 However, it held
that the human and genus claims failed to satisfy LWD because the specification failed
“to describe any structural features of the human or genus antibodies or antigens.241
The Federal Circuit affirmed, citing the Written Description Guidelines Example
16 (i.e., the antibody example) as “past precedent.”242 In Example 16, a hypothetical
patent applicant reports generating a mAb and successfully purifying and determining the
molecular weight for the corresponding antigen (a protein) – chemical structures are not
determined for either the antigen or mAb.243 The Guidelines conclude, in effect, that a
claim reciting a genus of functionally defined mAbs complies with LWD so long as the
relevant antigen has been “characterized,” and this characterization need not include a
determination of chemical structure.244 The mAb itself does not need to be characterized
except by its ability to specifically bind the antigen, i.e., its function. The court seemed
to agree with the board’s determination that deposit of the mouse mAb provided
sufficient characterization with respect to the mouse antigen to support the mouse mAb
claim. Thus, in Noelle, the only Federal Circuit decision not authored by Judge Lourie
that finds a biotechnology claim invalid under LWD, the panel apparently would have
upheld the validity of a broad genus claim defined solely in terms of function, illustrating
the general lack of support for LWD on the Federal Circuit.
240
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Not only were the invalidated human and genus claims extremely broad, they
could have been comfortably invalidated for lack of enablement. Although the issue of
enablement was never explicitly addressed, the Federal Circuit’s decision implicitly but
persuasively supports a finding that the claims were not enabled. In affirming the BPAI’s
determination that there was no interference-in-fact between the parties, the court
determined that one of skill in the art would have had no “reasonable expectation of
success” were they to try to isolate the human mAb based on Noelle’s disclosure
considering the state of the art at the time.245 Although the “reasonable expectation of
success” standard is normally associated with the nonobviousness inquiry, it is reasonable
to equate a lack of reasonable expectation of success with an undue amount of
experimentation, which would support a conclusion that a claim encompassing human
mAb was not enabled by Noelle’s disclosure. Thus, in this case LWD was not
functioning as a super-enablement requirement, but merely as an alternative basis for
invalidating the claims.
Shortly after Noelle was decided, the Federal Circuit again found claims invalid
under LWD in Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle.246 The patent was based on an
important scientific discovery that eventually led to the development of so-called “COX2 inhibitor” drugs.247 COX-1, an enzyme, is the target of many of the traditional nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDS), such as aspirin, acetaminophen and
ibuprofen.248 Scientists at the University of Rochester discovered a second COX enzyme,
COX-2, and had the insight that if one could identify a non-steroidal compound that
245
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specifically targeted COX-2 without affecting COX-1, that compound might possess the
anti-inflammatory properties of traditional NSAIDS while avoiding the undesirable
gastrointestinal side effects associated with traditional COX-1 inhibitors. In their patent
application they disclosed this insight, along with an assay that would allow one to screen
for molecules capable of specifically inhibiting the COX-2 enzyme without inhibiting
COX-1. 249 However, they did not disclose a single example of a molecule that would
specifically inhibit COX-2, nor did they provide any guidance as to what type of
molecule might have that property.250 Nevertheless, they obtained a patent broadly
claiming any method of treating a patient with a non-steroidal COX-2 inhibitor, and they
asserted this patent against drug manufacturers, such as Pfizer, who eventually did
succeed in identifying and ultimately marketing COX-2 inhibitors as drugs. In
Rochester, the Federal Circuit affirmed the invalidation of the claim on summary
judgment, holding that the mere disclosure of an assay for identifying a COX-2 inhibitor
was insufficient to satisfy LWD with respect to a claim generically covering the use of
such an inhibitor as a therapeutic.251
Rochester is notable in a number of regards. For one, it is the only decision, in
the courts or BPAI, to find a claim invalid for failure to comply with LWD with respect
to a molecule other than a biomolecule, 252 refuting the idea that LWD is specific to
genetic sequences, biomolecules, or biotechnology. And until very recently, it was the
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only judicial decision to invalidate a process claim under LWD253 – other cases apply it
to product claims, and in Rochester the patentee argued that the doctrine only applied to
product claims.
The court focused its LWD analysis upon the lack of structural description for any
molecule that would function as a COX-2 inhibitor. However, as was the case in Noelle,
a strong argument can be made that the claims were invalid for lack of enablement, and
that LWD functioned merely as an alternative grounds for invalidating the claims, rather
than as a super-enablement requirement. Although the Federal Circuit chose not to
decide the question of enablement in Rochester, 254 the district court had invalidated the
claims for failure to comply with both the enablement requirement and LWD.255 Not
only did the purported inventors fail to disclose a single compound falling within the
scope of the claim, they themselves apparently never succeeded in identifying such a
molecule (and hence never enabled one to actually practice the claimed invention).
Rather, history shows that is was only after multiple pharmaceutical companies instituted
programs to identify and develop COX-2 inhibitors that any mode of practicing the
invention was enabled.256 Not only did the patent specification fail to enable a single
mode of practicing the claimed invention, but the scope of the claim was expansive,
purporting to cover the use of any molecule having the desired function, and should have
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been invalidated for exceeding the “reasonable correlation” test for compliance with the
enablement requirement.257
In re Wallach,258 decided in 2004, is notable as the only post-Lilly judicial that to
my mind actually applies LWD as a super-enablement requirement, invalidating a genetic
sequence claim that very likely could have withstood an enablement challenge.
Wallach’s patent specification describes the successful purification of a human protein
identified as “TBP-II,” along with a description of about 5% of the proteins structure and
some other physical characteristics of the protein, such as its size and physiological
activity.259 Standard methodology was available at the time which would generally
allow one to isolate a gene for a particular protein based on the information Wallach
provided with respect to TBP-II. Based on this disclosure, the PTO issued Wallach a
patent claiming the TBP-II protein, but balked at allowing claims directed to any DNA
molecule that would code for the protein, i.e., TBP-II genes, citing LWD and Wallach’s
failure to provide a chemical structure for the full-length protein, or any full-length gene
encoding the protein. In effect, the PTO interpreted LWD as requiring a strict disclosure
of structure for DNA sequences, but not for protein sequences.
The Federal Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Lourie, affirmed the BPAI’s
decision. The court noted that a disclosure of the complete structure for the TBP-II
protein that would have been enough to satisfy LWD with respect to the TBP-II gene
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(based on the genetic code and the known relation between DNA and protein
sequence).260 However, the specification disclosed the structure of only about 5% of the
TBP-II protein, and hence only about 5% of the DNA sequence encoding it. Wallach
argued that “possession” is the ultimate test for compliance with LWD, and that the
partial structural information provided for the protein, combined with known
methodology for using such information to isolate the corresponding gene, would have
been sufficient to put a PHOSITA in possession of the gene. However, at least in this
specific context, the court found that an enabling disclosure that would put a PHOSITA
in constructive possession of the genetic sequence was not enough to satisfy LWD.
Harking back to Lilly, the court interpreted LWD as strictly requiring a description of the
gene’s structure, either explicitly or implicitly (by disclosure of the protein’s structure).261
The court did not address the issue of enablement; however, a quite plausible
argument could be made that the claim could withstand an enablement challenge. The
patent application claims priority to a 1989 filing date, long after Lilly’s 1977 filing date
and at a time when it would have been fairly routine to clone a DNA sequence based on
the protein information provided by Wallach.262 1989 is well after the filing dates of the
patent applications at issue in In re Bell and In re Deuel, and those decisions reflect the
PTO’s determination that at that time the state of the art would have allowed one in
possession of a protein to apply standard technologies to isolate the corresponding gene
without undue experimentation.263 In any event, the court’s decision in Wallach is
clearly focused on a lack of structural description, not the amount of experimentation that
260
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would be required to isolate the gene, or constructive possession of the gene, and in this
sense LWD is being applied as a super-enablement requirement.
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Wallach argued that it was irrational and
inconsistent for the PTO to require a complete structural disclosure for the TBP-II gene
but not for the corresponding protein, correctly pointing out that anyone having
possession of a protein would by definition be in possession of the gene encoding it, since
the protein itself implicitly defines all of the genetic sequences that would encode it. The
court, however, rejected this argument, holding that regardless of whether or not structure
was required to satisfy LWD with respect to a protein, structure was clearly required to
satisfy LWD with respect to a genetic DNA sequence.264
One might conjecture that Judge Lourie’s acquiescence to the PTO’s
determination that the protein claims satisfed LWD might merely reflect judicial restraint,
and a reluctance on his part to venture an opinion on a matter not explicitly before the
court. However, both the PTO and applicant had briefed this issue, and in other instances
he has shown no hesitancy to express his opinion with regard to issues that have not even
been addressed by the parties.265
How can one reconcile Wallach’s apparent strict requirement of structural
disclosure with other Federal Circuit decisions, such as Amgen v. HMR, Noelle, Capon,
and Falkner, which clearly downplay the relevance of structure? Note that the claims at
issue in Wallach are much more closely analogous to the claims at issue in Lilly; in both

264

378 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
For example, in Wallach he pronounced that the state of technology had advanced to the point where a
protein of known amino acid sequence could put on in possession of the genus of DNA encoding it, even
though that question was not before the court. In In re Deuel, he raised potential enablement issues with
regard to certain claims, even though issues of enablement had not been addressed by the parties.
265

72

cases, the applicant attempts to claim a naturally-occurring genetic sequence per se.
Thus, the claims assert a right to exclude any use of an isolated form of a naturallyoccurring biomolecule. In other cases where the court upholds claim validity in the face
of an LWD challenge, the biomolecule at issue is not naturally-occurring, but rather a
synthetic product of biotechnological engineering.266
One way of rationalizing Wallach, Lilly, and generally a LWD that requires a
structural description to support claims to naturally-occurring gene sequences, is that it
provides a useful symmetry with earlier Federal Circuit decisions applying the
nonobviousness requirement to newly isolated genetic sequences. In In re Bell and In re
Deuel, the Federal Circuit reversed BPAI decisions that had found claims to naturallyoccurring gene sequences obvious in view of prior art that would have rendered the
methodology for isolating and sequencing the genes obvious.267 Bell and Deuel have
been widely interpreted as establishing a special, strict nonobviousness standard for
genetic sequences (or biotechnology inventions), whereby a gene sequence can
essentially only be rendered obvious by a disclosure of the genes chemical structure.268
Note that under this standard, prior art that would “enable” a PHOSITA to isolate the
gene sequences “without undue experimentation” (using the terms “enable” and “without
undue experimentation” in their conventional, not legal sense) would not be enough to
render the gene sequence obvious.
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A jurisprudence under which prior art that enables an invention and provides a
clear motivation to make the invention, yet does not render the invention obvious, results
in a troubling asymmetry between the patentability requirements of Section 103
(nonboviousness) and Section 112, first paragraph (adequate disclosure). LWD, by
requiring a disclosure of chemical structure in the case of claims directed to gene
sequences that have yet to be isolated or structurally defined, restores the symmetry
between 103 and 112, and in that sense achieve a desirable policy effect. Perhaps this
explains the retention of a strict requirement of structural disclosure for this particular
type of invention (as exemplified in Lilly and Wallach), while the courts have distanced
themselves from any strict requirement of structure outside this specific context.
This symmetry could have been achieved in other, perhaps preferable ways. For
example, the Federal Circuit could effectively overrule Bell and Deuel, clarify that there
is no special obviousness standard for biotechnology inventions, and find that an explicit
disclosure of structure is not necessary if a biotechnology invention is otherwise
obvious.269 Alternatively, if Bell and Deuel are to be retained, the desirable symmetry
might have been better achieved if the Federal Circuit had created a special enablement
standard for inventions directed to naturally-occurring gene sequences in a manner that
mirrors Bell and Deuel. After all, if the court can create special rules of obviousness for
certain biotechnology inventions, why not corresponding special rules of enablement?
One advantage of using enablement rather than written description to achieve this valid
policy objective would have been an avoidance of the doctrinal confusion caused by the
creation of LWD as a distinct disclosure requirement.
269
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Finally, it should be noted that if LWD is really only functioning as a superenablement requirement in the limited context exemplified by Lilly and Wallach, i.e.,
attempts to claim gene sequences based solely on the disclosure of a protein and general
methodology for isolating a gene based on knowledge of the protein encoded by the gene,
then the actual impact of LWD will be of diminishing importance. In the very early days
of biotechnology, typically a protein was isolated and characterized, and then scientists
used the protein as the basis for isolating the corresponding gene - this is the scenario at
play in Amgen v. Chugai, Fiers v. Revel, Lilly, Wallach, Bell and Deuel. However, as
biotechnology developed it became more and more typical that the genetic sequence is
determined prior to identifying the protein. Indeed, since Lilly was decided, Wallach has
been the only judicial decision applying LWD to this type of invention, and there are no
BPAI decisions (other than Wallach) applying LWD in this manner.270 Wallach’s
priority date of 1989 was still relatively early in the development of biotechnology. To
the extent the application of LWD as a super-enablement requirement is limited to this
specific category of invention, one should expect it to be of diminishing relevance.
In Lizardtech v. Earth Resource Mapping, decided in late 2005, the Federal
Circuit for the first time appeared to find a claim invalid under LWD that was not related
to biotechnology or chemistry. 271 The specification disclosed a method for compressing
a large digital image for storage in a computer memory, but broadly claimed any method
of achieving that desired result.272 While the district court found the claim invalid under
LWD, the claim could (and should) have been found invalid for lack of enablement, since
it claimed in functional terms any method of achieving a desired result based on a limited
270
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disclosure of a single method of achieving that result. The Federal Circuit affirmed, but
the manner in which the district court’s decision is affirmed is quite unusual and fully
supports my thesis that for most practical purposes the criteria for satisfying LWD and
enablement are essentially co-extensive, so that LWD does not impose any meaningful
limitations beyond those already imposed by enablement.
Although the district court in Lizardtech invalidated the claim under LWD, the
Federal Circuit did not actually affirm on the basis of LWD, but rather effectively skirts
the issues by never using the term “written description requirement” in the decision.
Without even acknowledging the long line of cases that have held that the enablement
and written description requirements are two distinct requirements, the court merges the
two doctrines into what it terms the “written description clause” of section 112.273 It then
explains that the clause “has been construed to mandate that the specification satisfy two
closely related requirements.” First, it must describe the manner and process of making
and using the invention so as to enable a person of skill in the art to make and use the full
scope of the invention without undue experimentation, i.e, the traditional test for
enablement. Second, it must describe the invention sufficiently to convey to a PHOSITA
that the patentee had possession of the claimed invention at the time of the application,
i.e., the traditional written description test.274 Further, the court states that the two
requirements usually “rise and fall together,”275 echoing back to as similar sentiment
expressed in decisions like Clontech. Expanding upon this point, the court states that “a
recitation of how to make and use the invention across the full breadth of the claim is
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ordinarily sufficient to demonstrate that the inventor possesses the full scope of the
invention, and vice verse. This case is no exception.”276
After effectively merging the criteria for satisfying the enablement and LWD
requirements, the court essentially applied traditional enablement analysis as the basis
for it’s affirmation of the lower court’s invalidation of the claim under LWD.277
Lizardtech, far from supporting the notion of LWD as a distinct super-enablement
requirement, clearly supports a conclusion that the two requirements are essentially
redundant, justifying their merger into a unitary “written description clause.”
2.

LWD in the District Courts
Turning now to reported federal district court decisions, it is perhaps telling that I

was only able to identify one decision, not the subject of a subsequent reported appellate
decision, wherein a LWD-based challenge to the validity of a patent claim succeeded. In
Carnegie Mellon University v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., a representative claim at issue
purported to cover recombinant plasmids containing a DNA polymerase I gene, isolated
from any bacterial source, under the control of a conditionally controllable foreign
promoter. 278 The patent specification disclosed the structure for a single DNA
polymerase I gene from a single species of bacteria, E. coli. On motion for summary
judgment, the court held the claims to be invalid under LWD.
The district court based its decision on a strict application of LWD, focusing on
the lack of any structural description that would distinguish genetic constructs falling
276
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within the scope of the claim from other genetic sequences. However, it is important to
keep Carnegie-Mellon in perspective. Not only is this the only district court decision to
apply LWD to invalidate a claim, the decision has effectively been overruled by a series
of subsequent Federal Circuit decisions, particularly Enzo II, Capon, Invitrogen and
Falkner.
Perhaps most on point is Capon. In that case, the claim at issue recited any DNA
construct comprising two elements: (1) some portion of an antibody (not a specific
antibody, but essentially any antibody); and (2) some portion of a protein defined solely
by its function and its location of expression in the body (on the surface of cells in the
immune system), and the court held that such a broad, functionally defined claim could
satisfy LWD. The two genetic elements are defined in much broader, generic terms than
the DNA Pol I gene recited in the Carnegie-Mellon claim, and with much less structural
constraint.279 If the standard for compliance with LWD adopted by the court in Capon
were applied in Carnegie-Mellon, the validity of the claim under LWD would have
almost certainly been upheld.
It should be noted that some commentators have identified additional decision
wherein biomolecule claims have been invalidated under the written description
requirement and implied that the court’s decision was LWD-related. However, to the
best of my knowledge all of these decisions involved traditional written description, not
LWD. For example, a recently published comment seems to identify Abbot Laboratories
v. Inverness Medical Technology280 as an example of LWD being applied to a
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biotechnology patent. 281 However, the case actually involved traditional written
description doctrine – in its decision, the court explicitly disclaims the applicability of
LWD to the facts of the case, finding the doctrine applicable only to “biological
materials.”282
3.

LWD in the BPAI
I identified nine decisions where the BPAI found claims invalid for failure to

comply with LWD. This occurred either when the board affirmed an examiner’s LWD
rejection, or sometimes when the board raised the objection sua sponte. Notably, all of
the BPAI’s LWD decisions are in the area of biotechnology, illustrating the extent to
which the PTO views LWD as a biotechnology-specific doctrine.283
Of the nine BPAI decisions, six involved the appeal of an examiner’s decision to
reject a claim or claims for failure to comply with both the enablement and LWD
requirements, i.e, examiners tend to apply LWD in a manner that is redundant with
enablement rather than as a super-enablement requirement. In three out of the six, the
BPAI affirmed both the enablement and the written description rejections, and in the
other three the BPAI affirmed the written description rejection and chose not to decide
the enablement question as moot.
In this section I succinctly summarize the nine decisions. Note that the
invalidated claims are all very broad, and as a consequence are either explicitly held
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invalid for violation of the enablement requirement (by the BPAI and/or the patent
examiner), or could have easily been found invalid under the enablement requirement if
the BPAI had elected to take that approach.
As discussed earlier, on a number of occasions the courts and BPAI have rejected
LWD-based challenges to claims broadly encompassing functionally defined variants of a
disclosed biomolecule.284 However, the BPAI has on two occasions found claims of this
sort invalid under LWD. In Ex parte Copeland,285 the earliest BPAI decision I found that
decides an LWD issue, the patent applicant disclosed the amino acid sequence of a
“human polymerase catalytic polypeptide,” and based on this disclosure attempted to
claim any isolated DNA sequence “encoding a polypeptide having an amino acid
sequence sufficiently duplicative of that of the human polymerase catalytic polypeptide”
to retain human polymerase function. The claim is very similar to the claim found
invalid for lack of enablement in Amgen v.Chugai, even using the same “sufficiently
duplicative” language. The board reversed the examiner’s rejections of the claim based
on anticipation and obviousness, but raised enablement and LWD rejections sua sponte,
an example where LWD and enablement were explicitly applied in a redundant fashion.
Later, in Ex parte Grotendorst,286 the BPAI affirmed a LWD rejection of a similar
claim. The inventor had isolated a novel protein, and attempted to claim in broad terms
any variant of the protein retaining the same “reactivity” (meaning function). The
examiner had also rejected the claim for lack of enablement, but the board declined to
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address the issue of enablement as moot. Nevertheless, the claim is clearly analogous to
the claim at issue in Amgen v. Chugai and Copeland, and the board could have easily
upheld the enablement rejection in this case as well.
In Ex parte Reinherz et al.,287 the patent application claimed a genus of chimeric
genes, as well as the fusion proteins encoded by the chimeras. Although the examiner
did not raise enablement or written description rejections, on appeal the BPAI raised the
issues sua sponte and rejected the chimeric gene claims for failure to comply with LWD
and the enablement requirement. The application eventually did issue as a patent, with
claims limited to specific, disclosed DNA sequences.288
The outcome in Reinherz is hard to reconcile with subsequent decisions by the
BPAI and Federal Circuit upholding the validity of chimeric gene claims. Note in
particular the close analogy to the facts in Capon, where the Federal Circuit reversed a
BPAI decision that had found a claim to a broad genus of chimeric genes encoding fusion
proteins invalid under LWD.289 The claims at issue in Reinherz and Capon are very
similar in terms of breadth and supporting disclosure – both involve chimeric genes
comprising elements encoding portions of immune system proteins, both encompass a
huge genus of gene chimera variants, and both are supported by disclosure of one or a
few species falling within the claim. Probably the most reasonable explanation for the
divergent outcomes is that the BPAI decided Reinherz prior to Enzo II, at a time when the
BPAI likely felt compelled by the strong language in Lilly to apply a strict, structurefocused interpretation of LWD. If the BPAI were to decide the case today, subsequent to
287
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decisions like Enzo II and Capon, it would likely not find the claim to violate LWD. In
fact, several examples of the BPAI reversing LWD rejections of similar chimeric gene
claims are described supra in Section IV[A][3][e].290
In Ex parte Janjic,291 the BPAI entered a sua sponte LWD rejection to a claim
directed to “a method for inhibiting angiogenesis comprising administering a
pharmaceutically effective amount of a nucleic acid bFGF ligand,” i.e., a nucleic acid
molecule capable of specifically binding the protein bFGF.292 The board pointed out that
the specification provided examples of nucleic acid bFGF ligands falling into two distinct
structural families, and noted that in all likelihood other, yet to be discovered, structural
families existed sharing no structural similarity with either of the two disclosed families,
while the claim encompasses all nucleic acids capable of binding to a specified ligand,
including the yet-to-be discovered structural families. The molecule is defined
exclusively in terms of function, and the specification provides no disclosure of any
correlation between structure and function. The claim is also extremely broad, and could
have easily been invalidated under a conventional enablement approach.293
In Ex parte Weinberg,294 the inventors had identified a single base difference
responsible for the conversion of a proto-oncogene (a ras oncogene) to the corresponding
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oncogene.295 Based on this disclosure, they attempted to claim essentially any nucleic
acid probe capable of detecting any single base difference responsible for the conversion
of any proto-oncogene to the corresponding oncogene.296 The claim scope is extremely
broad relative to the disclosure, purporting to cover any and all oncogenes, protooncogenes and base differences, including the many that were not yet discovered at the
time the patent application was filed. Moreover, there is no structural limitation on the
claimed probes. The board raised a sua sponte LWD rejection to the claim. Again, in
view of the extreme breadth of the claims relative to the limited disclosure, this claim
could have also been invalidated for under the enablement requirement.
Interestingly, a dependent claim in Weinberg limited to human ras oncogenes was
allowed by the BPAI and ultimately issued. Subsequent research has shown that there
are actually multiple ras proto-oncogenes, and numerous base differences resulting in
their conversion to oncogenes.297 The claim has no explicit structural limitations, so
these later discovered variants apparently all fall within the literal scope of the claim.
Thus, we have yet another example where LWD has not restricted the ability of
biotechnology inventors to obtain relatively expansive scope of protection based on a
quite limited disclosure.
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In Ex parte Granados,298 the BPAI upheld LWD and enablement rejections of a
claim reciting a transformed plant comprising an expression vector, the expression vector
comprising a gene encoding an “invertebrate intestinal mucin (IIM) protein” operably
linked to an expression control sequence (i.e., a promoter). The applicant had disclosed
the structures for two IIM proteins derived from a single species of insect. Note the
extreme breadth of the claim, encompassing as it does all invertebrates, relative to a
limited disclosure of two examples of the claimed protein family, both derived from the
same insect. Appropriately, the examiner and board explicitly found the overly broad
claim invalid for lack of enablement, yet another example of the redundancy between
LWD and enablement as applied by the PTO.299
In Ex parte Drucker et al.,300 claims directed to mammalian homologs of a mouse
promoter region were rejected under LWD, but not for lack of enablement.301 The
rejections were essentiallly based on the fact that the claims defined the homologs
primarily in functional terms without adequate disclosure of a relationship between
structure and function. The BPAI affirmed, noting, for example, that the specification
described neither the structure of the claimed promoters, nor a functional assay to
correlate structure to function. An Amgen v. Chugai-type interpretation of the
enablement requirement could have easily served as an alternative basis for invalidating
the claims.
298

Appeal No. 2002-2030, Application No. 09/294,663, at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd022030.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
299
The board states that it was “well established” that a protein sequence does not provide adequate written
description for a DNA encoding it, a proposition later clearly refuted in In re Wallach when the Federal
Circuit held that a protein sequence does provide adequate written description for the DNA sequences
encoding it. 378 F.3d att1333-35 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
300
Appeal No. 2004-2356, Application No. 09/833,740, at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd042356.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
301
A homolog is a genetic sequence related to a second genetic sequence by descent from a common
ancestral DNA sequence – typically homologs share some degree of structural similarity.
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In Ex parte Polonsky et al.,302 a method of screening for a modulator of a “calpain
10” (a class of proteins) was rejected for lack of enablement under LWD. The BPAI
interpreted the claim broadly as encompassing “any ‘calpain 10’ of any structure from
any organism.” The LWD rejection was affirmed because the board agreed with the
examiner that the specification failed to disclose how one would even be able to
distinguish between a calpain 10 and other proteins, particularly structurally similar
proteins like calpain 5 and 6. This would seem to pose a problem of definiteness; the
examiner did make a definiteness rejection, but for some reason the board reversed that
rejection while affirming a LWD rejection essentially premised on the “indefiniteness” of
the claims. The enablement rejection was considered moot, but again I would suggest
that a claim encompassing “any ‘calpain 10’ of any structure from any organism,”
without providing sufficient guidance to even distinguish between a calpain 10 and other
non-calpain-10 proteins, would clearly fail to satisfy the enablement requirement.
Finally, Ex parte Rothschild303 involved a claim directed to a method of screening
animals for litter size by looking for polymorphisms in a specified gene sequence.304 The
claim was supported by the disclosure of three such polymorphisms, all in pig. The
examiner rejected the claim for inadequate enablement and LWD, noting that the claimed
genus included “an enormous number” of polymorphisms, without providing any
“structural limitations or limitations which provide guidance on the identification of
sequences which meet these functional limitations of associating a polymorphism with
litter size.” The board affirmed the LWD rejection, noting that the three examples were
302

Appeal No. 2005-0258, Application No. 09/768,877, at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd050258.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
303
Appeal No. 2005-1169, Application No. 09/900,063, at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd051169.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
304
A polymorphism is often defined as a genetic variant that appears in at least 1% of a population.
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insufficient to support the scope of the claim, but without providing any guidance as to
how one would determine how many examples would be enough. The board also found
relevant the fact the disclosure identified no common structural elements (i.e, no
correlation between structure and function), and the fact that all the examples were from
pig and the claim encompasses all animals. The board did not address the enablement
rejection, finding it moot in light of it’s determination based on LWD, but the enablement
rejection clearly should have been upheld in view of the lack of “reasonable correlation”
between the expansive claim scope and limited disclosure.
Note that in these nine decisions, there is not a single example of the BPAI
applying LWD in a manner that prevents an inventor of a biotechnology invention from
patenting her invention for failure to provide chemical structure, a primary fear voiced by
Lilly’s critics. Instead, in every decision the issue is one of claim breadth, with the
examiner and/or BPAI applying LWD as a tool for limiting claims to a reasonable scope
of coverage, a result that could have been better achieved using enablement.305
V.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
It has been repeatedly asserted that LWD is a super-enablement requirement, i.e,

that the test for compliance with LWD is more stringent than for compliance with the
enablement requirement.306 If this were in fact the case, one would expect to find judicial
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In every case, the patent applicant would be able to patent her invention in narrower terms, and in many
of the cases the applicant did ultimately receive narrower patents claims. These “narrower” claims are in
many cases still quite broad, e.g., the claims that issued from Ex parte Janjic in U.S. Patent No. 6,759,392.
306
See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. 314 F.3d at 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The
enablement requirement is often more indulgent than the written description requirement.”; Sven J.R.
Bostyn, Written Description after Enzo Biochem: Can the Real Requirement Step Forward Please?, 85 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 131, 149 (2003) (“The standard as developed in Eli Lilly and repeated now
in Enzo Biochem requires a more detailed disclosure than is required under the enablement requirement.
That implies that parties wishing to invoke this defense, will immediately go to the written description
requirement, as this implies a more detailed description, thus making the enablement requirement a
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decisions where a patent claim is found to be enabled but nevertheless invalid for failure
to comply with LWD.307 In fact, I was unable to locate a single judicial decision
explicitly finding a claim enabled but invalid under LWD. There is only one BPAI
decision explicitly treating LWD as a super-enablement requirement, finding a claim to
be “concededly enabled” but to fail LWD, but that decision was emphatically reversed by
the Federal Circuit in Capon.308
Conversely, a number of BPAI decisions explicitly find a claim to satisfy LWD
but nevertheless invalid for lack of enablement. For example, in Ex parte Reinherz the
board considered the validity of a set of claims directed to a genus of protein fusions, and
another set of claims directed to the genes encoding the fusion proteins. The board found
the gene claims to be invalid under LWD and enablement. However, the board did not
raise a LWD rejection with respect to the corresponding protein claims, only rejecting the
claims for lack of enablement, i.e., the board interpreted LWD as being less restrictive
than enablement, the opposite of a super-enablement requirement. Likewise, in Ex parte
Herrmann some claims were found invalid for violating the enablement requirement but
not for violation of LWD.

redundant one.”). Rai,, supra note 4 at 834-35 (“[T]he Lilly court used the written description requirement
as a type of elevated enablement requirement."); Mueller, supra note 63 at 617("The Lilly decision
establishes uniquely rigorous rules for the description of biotechnological subject matter that significantly
contort written description doctrine away from its historic origins and policy grounding. The Lilly court
elevates written description to an effective 'super enablement' standard.”)
307
The relationship would be analogous to that between lack of novelty and obviousness. Lack of novelty
can be thought of as “super-obviousness;” generally it follows that if an invention lacks novelty it is
implicitly obvious, while it quite common for a novel invention to nevertheless be obvious.
308
In Ex Parte Janjic the BPAI reversed an examiner’s enablement rejection and raised a Lilly rejection
sua sponte. Supra note 291. However, the enablement rejection was based on the examiner’s skepticism as
to whether the invention would perform the asserted functional utility, i.e., the “how to use” prong of the
enablement inquiry, not the “how to make” prong, which is the analog of LWD. In any event, the claim at
issue in Janjic is extremely broad, and the board could have easily rejected the claim for violation of the
“how to make” prong of LWD. Interestingly, despite the board’s sua sponte rejection these extremely
broad claims did ultimately issue, for reasons that are not apparent on the record.
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Most BPAI decisions involve appeals where the examiner has raised parallel
LWD and enablement rejections, targeting the same alleged deficiencies of disclosure
and applying functionally indistinguishable LWD and enablement tests. In other words,
it appears that patent examiners are not treating LWD and enablement as functionally
distinct patentability requirements, but rather as interchangeable requirements to be
applied in tandem to what are perceived to be overly broad biotechnology claims.
There are a number of BPAI and court decisions where claims are invalidated
solely for violation of LWD, usually because the enablement issue is found to be moot in
light of the LWD determination. Nevertheless, in the majority of these cases, the claims
could have easily been invalidated for violation of the enablement requirement. - LWD is
generally not limiting the patenting of biotechnology in a manner that could not readily
be achieved via the enablement requirement.
The one scenario where LWD appears to be functioning as a distinct “superenablement” requirement is with respect to what I will refer to as “prophetic cloning”
inventions, i.e., attempts to patent specific, naturally-occurring genetic sequences prior to
actually isolating the sequence or determining its structure, as in Lilly and Wallach. As
discussed supra, there might very well be valid policy reasons for restricting the
patenting of this sort of invention, e.g., to provide symmetry with the obviousness test
applied to prophetic cloning inventions in Bell and Deuel. In view of the technological
trend away from isolating and characterizing proteins prior to their corresponding genetic
sequences, this limited imposition of a “super-enablement” requirement should have little
impact on the patenting of biotechnology.
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In light of LWD’s limited impact in the courts, perhaps it should come as little
surprise that in the nine years that have elapsed since Lilly the courts have failed to
articulate a test for compliance with LWD that bears any meaningful distinction from the
criteria for establishing enablement. For example, the requirements of structure and
sufficient examples to support a genus apparently mandated by Lilly have been steadily
eroded by a series of Federal Circuit decisions exemplified by Enzo II, Noelle, Invitrogen,
Capon, and Falkner. The Federal Circuit’s fundamental test for compliance with LWD, a
demonstration of “possession” of the claimed invention, has been applied in a manner
indistinguishable from the test for enablement. For example, in Capon the courts cites
enablement cases and applies enablement criteria in assessing claims for compliance with
LWD, and held that the BPAI’s finding that the claims were invalid under LWD could
not be “reconciled” with the board’s determination that the claims appeared to be
enabled.309 In Rochester, the court stated that LWD “serves a teaching function ... in
which the public is given meaningful disclosure in exchange for being excluded from
practicing the invention for a limited period of time,” which sounds a lot like the policy
behind the enablement requirement.310 And in Lizardtech, the court combined LWD and
enablement into a unified “written description clause,” and effectively applied an
enablement standard to assess a claim for LWD compliance.311
In the years since Lilly, there has been some confusion as to whether LWD is a
doctrine particularly directed towards biotechnology,312 or a general requirement of
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418 F.3d at 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
358 F.3d at 922 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
311
Supra note 271.
312
Enzo I. 285 F.3d at 1025 (CAFC 2002) (Dyk, T., dissenting)
310
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patentability. There are strong indications that the PTO treats LWD as biotechnologyspecific, as evidenced by the Guidelines, which provide only biotechnology examples in
its treatment of LWD, and the fact that all of the BPAI decisions involve biotechnologyrelated invention. However, in Rochester the court applied LWD to invalidate claims
that were not limited to biomolecules (the claims covered the use of small molecule
COX-2 inhibitors), and in the decision Judge Lourie expressed his view that LWD is not
technology-specific. In the recent Lizardtech decision the Federal Circuit upheld a
district court’s invalidation of a software claim under LWD, although the Federal Circuit
never explicitly addressed LWD, instead folding LWD into a “written description clause”
that also encompasses the enablement requirement.
Another general observation is that many judicial and BPAI decisions express the
opinion that LWD is only applicable in cases where the claimed invention is a naturallyoccurring biomolecule, and not to synthetic biomolecules and genetic constructs, such as
the gene chimeras at issue in Capon, the synthetically-generated protein variants at issue
in Invitrogen, and the genetically-modified viruses claimed in Falkner.
Finally, it appears that in the courts LWD is being driven almost entirely by
Lilly’s author, Judge Lourie. Of the four post-Lilly decisions finding claims invalid under
LWD, two were authored by Judge Lourie (Rochester and Wallach), and Judge Lourie
was on the panel in a third (Lizardtech). Noelle was the only decision in which he did not
participate, and in that case the claims could have easily been invalidated for lack of
enablement. Furthermore, the Noelle panel explicitly endorsed the PTO’s Written

(“Eli Lilly imposes a “unique written description requirement in the field of biotechnology”); Dan L. Burk
& Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific? 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002) (Finding a
stringent application of LWD in biotechnology patents that does not appear in other disciplines).
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Description Guidelines, which provide that broad, functionally defined antibody claims
can comply with LWD without providing any structural description of the antibody or the
antigen recognized by the antibody, a clear departure from the original spirit of Lilly.
Judge Lourie also authored Enzo I, a particularly strong interpretation of LWD that he
later backed away from. Aside from Enzo II, Judge Lourie has apparently never sat on a
panel that rejected an LWD-based challenge to claim validity.313
It would seem that the primary impact of LWD has been to inject substantial
doctrinal confusion into the patent law. The one scenario where LWD appears to be
playing a substantive role, i.e., the policing of attempts to claim naturally-occurring
genetic sequences prior to their isolation or structural characterization, could more
appropriately be accomplished by a technology-specific application of the enablement
requirement, analogous to the Federal Circuit’s technology-specific application of the
obviousness requirement seen in Bell and Deuel. In the interest of fostering coherent
rules of patentability, the court’s should explicitly acknowledge the functional
redundancy of LWD and enablement and restore the historical distinction between the
two doctrines, employing the written description requirement to police new matter and
the enablement requirement to ensure that the scope of patents claims is commensurate
with the scope of the applicant’s disclosure.

313

With the exception of an early decision where he rejected an LWD-based challenge to an antibody claim
because the issue had not been properly addressed at the district court level. Johns Hopkins University v.
CellPro, Inc. 152 F.3d 1342, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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APPENDIX: SEARCH METHODOLOGY
The primary intent of this paper is to provide a comprehensive survey of all
publicly available decisions of the Federal Courts and the PTO Board of Patent Appeal
and Interferences (BPAI) pertaining to LWD. In keeping with this objective, I pursued a
search strategy designed to be as comprehensive as reasonably possible.
To identify relevant decisions of the federal court and BPAI, I conducted a search
of the Westlaw databases containing all federal court decisions and all BPAI decision.314
These databases were searched for any decisions subsequent to 1996 (Lilly was decided
in 1997) containing the term “written description” in the same paragraph as a reference to
any of the Federal Circuit decisions applying LWD to invalidate a patent claim prior to
2006, plus Enzo II.315 The same search was conducted in the corresponding Lexis
databases. I reviewed each decision to the extent necessary to make a conclusive
determination as to whether the case actually was what I will refer to as a “LWD
decision,” i.e., a case where analyzing a claim for compliance with LWD, as opposed to
cases involving traditional written.
To expand upon the Westlaw and Lexis searches, I also conducted a parallel
search of the PTO’s on-line database of “BPAI Final Decisions.”316 This database
contains final decisions of the BPAI, primarily appeal decisions, but also interference
decisions. I reviewed all of the BPAI decisions dated from Jan 1, 2000 to October 31,
2005, that were posted as of February 1, 2006, and all decisions between November 1,
314

The “All Federal Cases” and BPAI databases, searches last updated July 17, 2006.
The actual search terms used were: da(aft 1996) & “written description” /p ((Lilly /5 California) (enzo /5
gen-probe) (noelle /5 lederman) (Rochester /5 Searle) Wallach).
316
BPAI Final Decisions was available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/bpai.htm when I
began this study. The page was subsequently removed and all content relocated to the USPTO e-FOIA
page at http://des.uspto.gov/Foia/BPAIReadingRoom.jsp (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
315
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2005 and May 31, 2006 that were posted as of June 7, 2006. I reviewed each decision to
the extent necessary to determine whether it involved LWD. By using the PTO database
of BPAI decisions, I was able to identify a number of LWD decisions that for some
reason do not appear in either the Lexis or Westlaw database. Thus, the results of the
BPAI search are more comprehensive than could be accomplished with Lexis and
Westlaw alone.
The Jan 1, 2000 cut-off at is to some extent arbitrary, but I think justified by the
diminishing returns I saw in the sampling of decision I did identify dated prior to 2000.
These early decisions typically do not have well-developed LWD issues, because the
examiner’s typically did not include LWD or Lilly in their appeal briefs. Normally, in
these decisions where the examiner did not have an opportunity to explicitly address
LWD, the board simply pointed out the issue and directed the examiner to consider it
upon remand. There are a couple cases in this time period (found in the Westlaw/Lexis
searches) where the board does apply LWD to reject claims sua sponte, and these
decisions are included in my analysis.
A few caveats should be noted with regard to BPAI decisions. The PTO will
presumably only post publicly available decisions, so generally only in cases where the
file history is open to the public. The PTO generally seems to only post decisions where
the corresponding application has published or issued as a patent. Other decisions, which
are technically publicly available, might not appear in the database if the application at
issue does not publish or issue. For instance, one of the BPAI decisions I identified as an
example of the BPAI reversing a Lilly rejection does not appear in the PTO database (nor
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in the Westlaw and Lexis databases), but is publicly available because a continuation
application has published claiming priority to the application subject to the appeal.317
Because the database only contains publicly accessible decisions, there could be
some bias towards cases where rejections are reversed, since these tend to result in the
issuance of a patent. One would assume that in some cases the affirmation of a rejection
will result in the application becoming abandoned, and hence the decision never being
made available to the public. However, I don’t think this is a major issue. In many cases,
an affirmed rejection does not prevent a patent from issuing, because other claims in the
application are allowed. I observed many examples where a rejection has been affirmed
and the application went on to issue as a patent. Also, the more recent applications will
in many cases publish regardless of whether any patent issues, which is an alternative
mechanism for making the decision publicly available. Finally, in a personal
communication with a high ranking PTO official, I was informed that to the best of his
knowledge most BPAI decisions are posted on the PTO database.318
In short, no claim is made that the results of the searches are totally
comprehensive, and relevant decisions may have been overlooked. However, to the best
of my knowledge it is far more comprehensive than any previously published review of
LWD cases, and is sufficiently comprehensive to draw meaningful conclusions with
respect to the impact of LWD doctrine in the courts and BPAI.
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This particular decision was made available to me by an attorney who had worked on the case. The file
history of a pending unpublished patent application is available to the public if a U.S. patent publication
claims the benefit of the unpublished patent application. 37 C.F.R. § 1.14(a)(1)(v) (2006).
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Personal communication.
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